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PROPERTIES OF INTIMACY
EMILY J. STOLZENBERG*
ABSTRACT
Today, nearly nineteen million U.S. adults are cohabiting with an
intimate partner. Yet family law continues to struggle with the question
whether these unmarried partners should have relationship-based rights in
one another’s property. Generally speaking, states answer “no.” Because
cohabitants are not spouses, they’re treated like strangers. As a result, their
property rights usually follow title, and richer partners tend to walk away
with a large proportion of the property acquired during the relationship.
This Article shows the “cohabitant problem” to be no anomaly, but
rather the clearest manifestation of family law’s overarching structure. In
marital property regimes as well as in cohabitant disputes, states and
scholars have taken title as both a starting and a presumptive ending point,
which means that assigning property rights in any other way is
“redistribution” requiring special justification. This deferential approach to
title limits family law’s ability to achieve sharing outcomes, not only between
cohabitants, but also between spouses.
Rather than bowing to title and then redistributing, family law should
reconsider how it assigns property entitlements in the first instance. Nonfamily property law offers a promising model, for it often weighs intimacy in
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determining entitlements.
In relationships marked by dependence,
interdependence, and vulnerability—for example, those between neighbors,
co-owners, and decedents and heirs—property rights do not always hold with
the same force as they might against strangers. Instead, property law
acknowledges the social facts of ongoing, hard-to-exit relationships by
blunting the sharp edges of owners’ prerogatives. This approach, which I
describe as instantiating a “spectrum of intimacy,” allows property law to
recognize and support a broad range of close, complex relationships.
Family law should adopt property law’s spectrum of intimacy to
reshape marital property regimes and re-situate unmarried partners in the
space between spouses and strangers. Just as property law permits multiple
forms of joint ownership, family law should offer a menu of family statuses
of which marriage is but one. For partners who do not elect a status, family
law should apply a property-flavored equitable approach to distribution. By
protecting sharing between both cohabitants and spouses, this approach
reflects and honors the wide diversity of modern family relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central questions in modern family law is whether unmarried
partners should have rights in one another’s property when their relationships
end. Consider the following cases:
Michelle cohabited with her nonmarital partner, Lee, for six years.
She gave up her lucrative career to serve as a homemaker; all
property acquired during the relationship was titled in Lee’s name.
Does Lee owe Michelle anything when their relationship ends?1
When Victoria became pregnant, Robert told her that the law now
considered them husband and wife, without the need for any formal
ceremony. Over fifteen years, Victoria raised the couple’s three
children and helped Robert to advance his career. Should Robert
have to share any of the property he accumulated over the course
of the relationship with Victoria when the parties separate?2
Shaniqua and Curtis were together for twelve years. Shaniqua
cared for the parties’ son, performed other domestic labor,
financially supported Curtis while he embarked on his career, and
nursed him for five months while he recovered from a near-fatal
accident. Is Shaniqua entitled to some of Curtis’s assets when the
two break up?3
States tend to answer these questions in the negative. In Michelle’s
case, although the trial court awarded her rehabilitative alimony in an amount
based on two years of her former salary, the court of appeals overturned the
award as lacking any “basis whatsoever, either in equity or in law.”4 Victoria
discovered that, without a marriage license, she had no property rights.5 In
Shaniqua’s case, the same “statements” that “demonstrate[d]” her “loving
devotion and loyalty . . . undermine[d]” her legal claims against her former
partner.6

1. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
2. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979); see also Blumenthal v. Brewer,
69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016) (refusing to overturn Hewitt).
3. See Tompkins v. Jackson, No. 104745/2008, 2009 WL 513858, at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
3, 2009). Mr. Jackson is better known by his stage name, 50 Cent. Id. at *1.
4. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
5. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
6. Tompkins, 2009 WL 513858, at *13.

630

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:627

These results are not atypical. Because cohabitants are not spouses,
they’re treated like legal strangers—or worse.7 Unless unmarried couples
have executed a written contract outlining their mutual responsibilities, their
property rights usually follow title.8 As a result, the richer partner tends to
walk away with a large proportion of the resources accumulated during the
relationship when it ends.9
Scholars have long debated how, and even whether, family law should
intervene in former unmarried partners’ property disputes.10 The American
Law Institute’s 2002 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution proposed
establishing marriage-like obligations for cohabitants “who for a significant
period of time share[d] a primary residence and a life together as a couple,”
but no jurisdiction has adopted this approach.11 With nearly nineteen million
Americans currently cohabitating and states continuing to employ a
patchwork of mostly ineffectual approaches,12 the Uniform Law Commission
recently convened a committee to draft model legislation clarifying the
economic rights of unmarried cohabitants.13
I argue that part of what makes the “cohabitant problem” so intractable
is family law’s deferential approach to title. States and scholars have taken
title as both a starting and a presumptive ending point, which means that
assigning property rights in any other way is “redistribution” that requires
special justification. This approach entrenches regard for individual property
rights, which limits family law’s ability to achieve sharing outcomes.
Nor is family law’s deference to title limited to the context of
cohabitants. Indeed, marital property regimes also revolve to a surprising
degree around title. In common-law states, title defines married spouses’
property rights, colors equitable distribution awards, and reasserts itself with
a vengeance after divorce.14 Even community property jurisdictions employ
management rules that devolve to title.15 As a result, marital property

7. Courtney G. Joslin, Autonomy in the Family, 66 UCLA L. REV. 912, 931 (2019).
8. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(1)
& cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION]; see also
Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365,
1377–79 (2001) (describing ALI approach).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See generally Cohabitants Economic Remedies Act Committee, UNIF. L. COMM’N (2018),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=5f044999-b4b3458a-b6d4-d984885d913b (last visited June 24, 2021).
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.B.
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regimes tend to privilege titleholders and breadwinners over caretakers and
homemakers, both during marriage and at and after divorce.16
Connecting property disproportionality between unmarried partners to
property inequality between spouses—as this Article is the first to do—
reveals the common origin of both problems. Scholars have paid
considerable separate attention to economic unfairness in both marital and
cohabitant relationships,17 but there has been little discussion of the two
contexts together. The current debate about cohabitant obligations takes
marriage as a foil, without simultaneously examining marital property
regimes.18 This uncritical assumption of the marital baseline casts unmarried
partners’ property rights as a problem separate and distinct from how the law
treats spouses. Uncovering marital property regimes’ more covert deference
to title shows instead that the cohabitant regime is no anomaly, but rather the
clearest manifestation of family property law’s overarching structure.
Yet family law’s approach to ownership is far from inevitable. The
current framework begins by assuming that each partner owns individually
the property titled in his or her own name, and that assigning entitlements
otherwise requires some legal intervention.19 But while superficially
plausible, this conflation of title with ownership gets things
backward: Family members own what they do only because the law
recognizes some property claims and rejects others.20 Rather than beginning

16. See infra note 23.
17. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW (1987); ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992);
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); June Carbone & Margaret F.
Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL.
L. REV. 953 (1991); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of
Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413 (1996); Deborah L. Rhode &
Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on
Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191–210 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 1103 (1989); Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution
Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990).
18. Scholarly discussions of unmarried partners tend to focus on how family law distinguishes
between cohabitants and spouses. See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 58 (2017) (arguing that “the law polices the boundaries between marriage and
nonmarriage,” and “in doing so it actively defines the content of each”); cf. Clare Huntington,
Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 170
(2015) (stating that “the most fundamental divide in family law is between married and unmarried
couples”).
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part I.
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with title and then asking whether and how to redistribute between intimate
partners, as the law and current scholarly discussions tend to do, we should
reconsider how family law establishes property entitlements in the first
instance.
For an alternative model of ownership, we need look no further than
non-family property law. While family law has adopted an absolutist,
individualistic conception of property rights, property law itself often takes a
more multifaceted approach.21 Property law sometimes deviates from title,
or otherwise limits the authority of titular owners, in the service of other
values.22 For example, a number of well-known black letter doctrines
establish property rights on bases other than title, including labor, use, and
reliance.23 Property law also limits titleholders’ prerogatives, either by
curtailing the right to exclude others or restricting permissible uses, in
recognition of competing considerations.24 Property law draws a distinction
between title and ownership that family law often elides, allowing it more
flexibility to balance owners’ autonomy against other important values and
interests.
In particular, I argue that property law often weighs intimacy in
determining entitlements.25 In relationships defined by dependence and
interdependence—for example, those between neighbors, co-owners, and
decedents and heirs—property rights do not always hold with the same force
as they might against strangers. Instead, property law sometimes responds to
the special resource-based vulnerability that these kinds of relationships
engender by imposing certain obligations, burdens, or limits on owners.
Property law acknowledges the facts of social life by selectively blunting the
sharp edges of owners’ prerogatives. This approach, which I describe as
instantiating a “spectrum of intimacy,” allows property law to recognize,
legitimize, and support a broad range of close social relationships.
Property law’s approach to intimacy can help us to resituate unmarried
partners in the space between spouses and strangers, as well as to rethink the
structure of marital property holding.26 On a conceptual level, family law
should emulate property law by relaxing its deference to title. Rather than
“redistributing” as an exceptional matter, the family property system should
21. See David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 103, 104 (2009) (describing how the “absolute, individualistic view of property” came
to be identified with Blackstone); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xi
(2011) (describing property as “a set of institutions bearing a family resemblance”).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.A.1.
24. See infra Part II.A.2.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part III.
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establish corpuses of shared property, regardless of title, and define
appropriate criteria for distribution when relationships end. On a more
concrete level, family law should extend property’s spectrum of intimacy by
offering a menu of family statuses with differing degrees of financial
obligations. Intimate partners could choose between forms of family
property holding, just as co-owners can elect between different forms of joint
ownership. Marriage would anchor one end of the spectrum as the property
institution involving the most extensive degree of sharing. Cohabitants
would become neither spouses nor strangers, but rather partners in a different
kind of cooperative endeavor still worthy of the law’s respect and support.
These changes would not only produce fairer resource distributions upon
family dissolution. They could also help to ameliorate unjustified legal and
social inequality between marital and nonmarital families.27
Relaxing the hegemony of title would also promote richer conceptions
of both ownership and autonomy in family law. Family law’s regard for
individual property rights reflects its atomistic approach to family relations,
under which freedom inheres in formally consenting to one’s family
obligations.28 This vision understands property’s primary purpose to be
safeguarding individual autonomy, a perception that heightens the stakes of
conflicts between family members’ sometimes competing interests.29 Deemphasizing title would refocus family property law away from
individualism and toward norms of mutuality and sharing, emphasizing that

27. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686
(2008) (advocating for “[r]esisting the normative and epistemic frame that values nonmarital forms
of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage”); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as
Monopoly: History, Tradition, Incrementalism, and the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2009) (arguing that the state is complicit in causing “the lesser social
value of civil unions vis-a-vis marriage”); Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right
to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 430 (2017) (“Marital supremacy continues to pervade the
civil law despite the fact that about half of all American adults today live outside of marriage.”);
Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1210
(2016) (arguing that under Obergefell, “the rationale for marriage equality rests . . . on the
fundamental inequality of other relationships and kinship forms”); Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital
Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2015)
(“Windsor . . . implicitly resurrects and reinforces claims that non-marital childrearing—and sexual
relationships outside of marriage, more generally—are inherently less worthy of respect than marital
relationships.”); cf. Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage,
6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 110 (2015) (arguing in Obergefell’s wake that “[a]n alternative
concept of dignity more infused with democratic and pluralist values could encompass respect for
variation in kinship, sexuality, and affiliation”).
28. Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 1997–98 (2018).
29. Cf. Jo Carrillo, Liberty and Community in Marriage: Expanding on Massey’s Proposal for
a Community Property Option in New Hampshire, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 289, 291, 314 (2017)
(describing “an economic morality” in family law that “valorizes the needs of the autonomous
individual at the cost of obscuring the needs of the community”).
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the institution’s fundamental purpose is to create conditions that facilitate
cooperative collective life.30 With title no longer so determinative, we can
finally begin to consider what values beyond a narrow vision of individual
autonomy the institutions of family and property should serve.31 In these
ways, property law’s spectrum of intimacy can help to forge a new vision of
family property holding, one better equipped to do economic and relational
justice between intimates.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I exposes the outsize role of title
in both the marital and nonmarital property systems. Part II uncovers how
non-family property law instantiates a “spectrum of intimacy” by selectively
deviating from title in disputes between non-strangers and argues that this
approach offers an attractive alternative for family law. Part III employs the
intimacy approach to sketch a less individualistic alternative to current family
property doctrine and explains its theoretical and normative implications. I
close by placing family law more closely into conversation with property law,
a move that presents intriguing possibilities for both fields.
I. INDIVIDUALISM IN FAMILY LAW
Scholars critiquing family law’s individualistic approach to property
tend to view the problem through one of two lenses. They either decry
unequal economic outcomes in marriage, or they criticize the law’s refusal to
extend relationship-based property rights to cohabitants.32 Juxtaposing
cohabitants and spouses reveals that the inadequacies of both marital and
nonmarital property regimes arise from the same structural feature: the
dominant role of title in the family property system. Cohabitants clearly
occupy a world of separate property,33 but the marital system also revolves
to a surprising degree around title. In common-law states, husbands and
wives own individually titled property separately during marriage,34 allowing
30. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1 (1997) (describing a “view” of
“property [a]s the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order”);
MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010).
31. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 137–38 (2009) (describing “freedom” as only one among many
capabilities necessary for “human flourishing” and explaining what flourishing entails);
Stolzenberg, supra note 28, at 2038 (arguing that “the outsized emphasis currently placed on
families’ economic functions . . . undermines their ability to fulfill other roles more important to
intimate and collective life”).
32. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 223 (4th ed. 2010).
OF
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spouses who so desire great leeway to exclude one another from their
property.35 And when spouses part ways, the laws of equitable distribution
and alimony systematically favor titleholding spouses.36 Even community
property jurisdictions employ management rules that devolve to title.37
Title’s prominent role means that individual, rather than shared, property
holding is the baseline of the family property system, and this orientation
constructs and perpetuates property disproportionality between intimate
partners.
A. Cohabitants and Separate Property
Nearly nineteen million Americans are currently cohabiting with, but
not married to, an intimate partner.38 Although states approach cohabitants’
property claims in a variety of ways, no state grants unmarried partners any
default property protections arising from the fact of their relationship. 39
Instead, cohabitants’ inter se property rights generally follow title. As a
result, unless unmarried cohabitants have titled property in joint name or
executed a written contract outlining their mutual responsibilities, poorer
partners have great difficulty in convincing courts to redistribute property
when a relationship ends.40
Four states—Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, and Louisiana—bar all claims
“arising from” a cohabitant relationship.41 In Illinois, for example, courts
refuse to “enforce mutual property rights where th[e] rights [asserted] are
rooted in a marriage-like relationship between the parties.”42 Cohabitants
may bring common-law claims that “ha[ve] an independent economic basis,”
but “individuals acting privately by themselves, without the involvement of

35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2–3.
See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
Table AD-3: Living Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Dec. 2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/adults.html.
39. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “cohabitation
without marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which normally attend the
marital relation”).
40. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (2016) (stating that
courts “impose[] almost no obligations without either an express agreement or evidence of
combined assets”).
41. See Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977); Gunderson v. Golden, 360 P.3d 353,
355 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015); Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 852 (Ill. 2016), ’aff’g Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La.
Ct. App. 1983).
42. Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 841; accord Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 323 (stating that
cohabitants “have no rights in each other’s property”).
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the State,” are not permitted to “create marriage-like benefits.”43 Indeed,
Illinois has a stated public policy “disfavoring the grant of mutually
enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”44
Cohabitants in these states lack any sort of relationship-based property
protections.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, only a few states have judicially
created family property schemes for cohabitants. In the state of Washington,
unmarried partners living in a “committed intimate relationship” are entitled
to an equitable distribution of property acquired during the relationship.45
Nevada permits cohabitants to “agree to hold property . . . as though it were
community property,” while Kansas and Oregon allow relationship-based
recovery under an implied joint venture theory.46 Ten jurisdictions give
couples recourse to the state’s divorce distribution scheme if they can show
that they entered into a common-law marriage.47 Although these regimes
offer marital or marriage-like family property protections for qualifying
couples, their scope is limited. For each requires a court to conduct a factintensive assessment of the parties’ relationship before recovery becomes
available, and relatively few couples pass the bar.48
43. Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 856, 852; accord Abrams v. Massell, 586 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2003) (enforcing cohabitants’ written contract to make a will because “any romantic or
sexual involvement between the parties was . . . ’incidental to the contract rather than required by
it’”) (quoting Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 646, 646 (Ga. 1992))); Phillips v. Blankenship, 554
S.E.2d 231, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (authorizing cohabitants to pursue equitable claims not “based
on sexual intercourse”); Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325 (allowing cohabitants to “assert [their]
rights in [a] common endeavor” if it is a “commercial enterprise . . . independent of the illegal
cohabitation”).
44. Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 858. But see id. at 868 (Theis, J., dissenting upon denial of
rehearing) (suggesting it may be “irrational and discriminatory to deny the protections of the
common law to persons who never could have used the marriage provisions because of their sexual
orientation”).
45. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835–36 (Wash. 1995); see also id. at 834 (defining
such a relationship as “a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist”).
46. W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992); Eaton v. Johnston,
681 P.2d 606, 610–11 (Kan. 1984); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978); Wilbur v. DeLapp,
850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]n distributing the property of a domestic relationship,
we are not precluded from exercising our equitable powers to reach a fair result based on the
circumstances of each case.”); see also Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”:
A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1280 (2015) (describing schemes).
47. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 26
(2010) (“Eleven U.S. jurisdictions still recognized common law marriage as of 2009—Alabama,
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, and Utah.”). But see ALA. CODE § 30-1-20(a) (2018) (“No common-law marriage
may be entered into in this state on or after January 1, 2017.”).
48. Cf. Antognini, supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that “courts in [Washington and Nevada] turn
to the lack of an actual marriage to deny couples the application of the divorce laws”); Strauss,
supra note 46, at 1279 (discussing relationship-based doctrines’ limited scope).
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Lying between these two poles, most states allow cohabitants to bring
general private law claims against a former partner.49 Yet contract and equity
provide little protection, for these doctrines are not well adapted to the
realities of cohabitant relationships.50 Not only does establishing these
claims require expensive and uncertain litigation, but recovery under them
can also be quite circumscribed.
Multiple legal and practical obstacles stand in the way of a successful
contract claim. Due to the nature of intimate relationships, most cohabitants
do not negotiate explicit contracts with one another, let alone memorialize
them in writing.51 This poses a problem in states that only enforce cohabitant
agreements exhibiting high degrees of formality. Florida, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and Texas require unmarried partners’ contracts to be executed in
writing and signed by both parties,52 while New York requires cohabitant
agreements to be express.53 Even in jurisdictions that will entertain them,
implied contract claims are rarely winners. These cases require courts to
“inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates . . . some . . . tacit understanding between the parties.”54 But
courts struggle to fill in ambiguous or silent contract terms without reliable
evidence of shared intent,55 while the requirement of bargained-for
consideration and the presumption that intimates render services gratuitously
fell many cohabitants’ claims.56 Thus the implied contract “inquiry tends to
49. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION, supra note 11, § 6.03, reporter’s notes, cmt.
b (2002).
50. Cf. BOWMAN, supra note 47, at 3.
51. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried
Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 417, 436 (1999); see also Strauss, supra note 46, at 1293 (“If intimate partners are going to
regulate their economic lives by contract, almost all of these agreements will be implied-in-fact
contracts for which the court infers the parties’ promises from their conduct.”).
52. MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075, 513.076 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 21:1-5(h) (2010) (also
requiring “independent advice of counsel for both parties”); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108
(2018); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (applying the Statute of
Frauds requirement “that contracts made upon consideration of marriage . . . be in writing . . . to
non-marital, nuptial-like agreements”). North Dakota announced, and then retreated from, a similar
rule. Compare Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (“If live-in companions intend
to share property, they should express that intention in writing.”), with McKechnie v. Berg, 667
N.W.2d 628, 632 (N.D. 2003) (stating that “joint bank accounts constitute writings evidencing
intent”).
53. Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (requiring cohabitant agreements
to demonstrate “the explicit and structured understanding of an express contract”).
54. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
55. See, e.g., Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1157 (describing the high “risk of error” in adjudicating
cohabitant contract claims).
56. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Contracts, 73 STAN. L. REV. 67, 99 (2021); Strauss, supra
note 46, at 1279, 1293; see, e.g., Williams v. Ormsby, 966 N.E.2d 255, 263–64 (Ohio 2012);
Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
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yield an outcome of no recovery,”57 even in cases where some kind of
recovery seems justified. In Friedman v. Friedman, for example, the
California Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence to support an implied
agreement for the man to provide post-relationship pendente lite financial
support to his disabled female partner, despite the parties’ twenty-one years
of marriage-like cohabitation.58
Equitable remedies provide more relief than contract claims,59 but even
these are seriously limited. Traditionally, “restitution is not available
for . . . voluntary transfers” or “to claimants who reasonably could have
negotiated a consensual exchange.”60 Some jurisdictions stick to these “two
traditional constraints,”61 which lead to the conclusion that “neither
[partner’s] contributions could unjustly enrich the other.”62 Moreover, some
states allow unjust enrichment claims only when the parties have
accumulated assets during their relationship.63 Equitable remedies can also
“be very complicated to plead and to prove,” making the results “inconsistent
and unpredictable.”64 Not only is relief in restitution “hard to obtain,” it can
also be “pitifully small.”65 In Gazvoda v. Wright, for example, the woman
received less than twenty-five percent of the assets accumulated during the
relationship, despite working side-by-side with her partner to build a
successful electric business.66
As the above discussion shows, cohabitants’ property rights effectively
follow title. Without a written contract, it is very difficult for an untitled
57. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 170 (2004); see also BOWMAN,
supra note 47, at 51 (questioning efficacy of contract remedies).
58. 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555,
559 (Ct. App. 1981) (vacating rehabilitative award as lacking legal basis).
59. DAGAN, supra note 57, at 166–67 (arguing that “[t]he various restitutionary headings,” which
include “unjust enrichment, resulting trust, constructive trust, quantum meruit,” and quasi- or impliedin-law contract, supply “the main source of” cohabitant recovery).
60. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO.
L. REV. 711, 712 (2006); see Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 56–57 (1978).
61. Sherwin, supra note 60, at 712.
62. Casad, supra note 60, at 55; see, e.g., Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So. 2d 453, 457–58 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997); Arwood v. Sloan, 560 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
63. Waage v. Borer, 525 N.W.2d 96, 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); see also BOWMAN, supra note
47, at 42–43 (“[I]f a cohabitant’s contributions . . . have been consumed by the couple and their
children during the relationship, she may . . . end up with nothing.”).
64. BOWMAN, supra note 47, at 44, 42.
65. Id. at 42; see also Antognini, supra note 18, at 43 (arguing that awards “generally” amount
to “much less than half of the assets accumulated during the relationship”); id. at 44–45 (2017)
(describing cases).
66. Gazvoda v. Wright, No. 07A01–0607–CV–288, 2007 WL 2284722, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App.
Aug. 10, 2007); see also Antognini, supra note 18, at 41–42, 44–45 (describing cases and noting
unequal distributions of property accumulated during cohabitation).
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partner to claim a portion of the assets accumulated during the relationship
when the couple parts ways. But as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
observed, “allowing no relief at all to one party in a . . . relationship
effectively provides total relief to the other, by leaving that party owner of
all the assets acquired through the efforts of both.”67 Without default rules
requiring distribution in derogation of title as a matter of course, richer
partners tend to walk away with a large proportion of an unmarried couple’s
resources when these relationships end.68
B. Spouses and the Hidden Hegemony of Title
Courts and scholars tend to use marriage as a foil in analyzing unmarried
partners’ property disputes, with many conclusions turning on the
observation that cohabitants are not spouses.69 And spouses do differ from
cohabitants in one very important way: By getting married, they formally
consented to the state applying its myriad rules governing spousal rights,
responsibilities, and obligations.70
Through marriage, spouses are
immediately eligible for default property protections, without any inquiry
into the character of their intimate relationship.
Although these protections are in many ways quite generous, deference
to title works to undermine sharing even in marital property regimes. During
intact marriages, the common law permits spouses to exclude one another
from any resources titled individually. Divorce law limits this ability when a
marriage ends, but assumptions of individual ownership color the equitable
distribution process, and the structure of alimony similarly asserts that each
spouse owns solely his or her post-divorce income. Even community
property states employ management and distribution rules that defer to title.
Because marital property regimes unduly privilege formal ownership and
control, pre- and post-divorce asset distributions tend to favor titleholders and
income earners over more economically vulnerable spouses.71 Just as
cohabitants live under a regime in which their default property rights follow
title, marital property regimes similarly revolve to a surprising degree around
title.
67. Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Wis. 1987).
68. See Antognini, supra note 18, at 8 (arguing that the law of nonmarriage denies or minimizes
redistribution to poorer cohabitants, who are usually women); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 40, at
63 (observing that Marvin and its progeny fail to “address[]” the dynamic “that typically gives more
power to the person with the greater income”).
69. See supra note 18.
70. See Emily J. Stolzenberg, Nonconsensual Family Obligations 12–13 (Mar. 16, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
71. This Article leaves aside the separate but related question of spouses’ ability to opt out of
sharing defaults through contract.

640

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:627

Uncovering marital regimes’ more covert deference to title shows that
the cohabitant regime is no anomaly. Instead, it presents the clearest
illustration of the family property system’s overarching individualistic
structure: Title governs unless there are “special” legal grounds for
redistributing, and even then, its logic shapes that redistribution. This titlebased structure makes it difficult for family property law to fully recognize,
let alone vindicate, relationship-based claims to shared resources.
1. Separate Property During Marriage
Although it is commonly presumed that spouses share during marriage,
domestic relations law does too little to require it.72 Married spouses’
property rights follow title in common-law states, while community property
management rules allow spouses great leeway to control individually titled
assets. Nor will courts interfere in property disputes during an intact
marriage. These default rules have important conceptual and practical
implications, both during marriage and upon divorce.
There are two kinds of marital property regimes in the United States,
whose main difference lies in the nature of spouses’ property rights during
marriage.73 In the forty-one common-law states, married spouses own and
control assets titled in their individual names separately.74 In other words,
both ownership and control of property follow title during marriage. In the
nine community property states, married spouses each own a present,
undivided, one-half interest in property acquired through either spouse’s
efforts since the date of marriage, regardless of title.75 In these jurisdictions,
although ownership does not follow title, control rights may.76 Thus title
matters during marriage in both kinds of jurisdictions, though to differing
degrees. Because title’s influence is clearest in common-law regimes, the
following discussion focuses mainly on this majority approach to spousal
ownership.77
In common-law states, title determines spouses’ property rights during
marriage. Under this approach, called “title theory,” marriage is a period of

72. “Domestic relations law” refers narrowly to the rules governing married couples. “Family
law” is a much broader term, encompassing all rules that govern families.
73. As I discuss in Parts I.B.2–3, common-law and community property states employ similar
divorce distribution and alimony schemes.
74. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 223.
75. Id. at 223. The community property states are Arizona, California, Indiana, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 224 n.7.
76. See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
77. The majority approach also shares property law’s common-law origin, making it the most
analogous comparator.
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default separate property holding.78 The law requires only as much marital
sharing as is necessary to satisfy the common-law duty of spousal support.79
These default rules burden spouses who wish to share and embolden those
who do not.
First, title theory imposes costs on spouses who seek to share property.
Many married couples maintain joint bank accounts and title large assets
jointly, but creating these forms of co-ownership requires intentional action
in common-law states.80 Moreover, it is difficult or impossible to title some
increasingly important sources of marital wealth, such as employer-based
retirement benefits, in joint name, even should spouses wish to do so. 81 As a
result, background separate-property rules can create titular “property
inequality in a marriage over time,” as a “wage-earning spouse, by default,
becomes richer relative to [a] spouse who labors at home.”82
More importantly, these default rules mean that title governs when
married couples disagree about financial issues, for the law affords spouses
little recourse against one another during marriage. Courts generally decline
to involve themselves in married couples’ property disputes, relying instead
on third parties to ensure that spouses provide one another with a certain level
of material support. In the case of McGuire v. McGuire, for example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court overturned an order requiring a husband to pay for
home improvements, furniture, household appliances, and clothing,
explaining that the wife could not maintain such an action unless the parties
were separated.83 Although critical of the husband’s tightfistedness, the court
insisted that “[t]he living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the
78. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 223; id. at 564 (stating that “equitable
distribution laws in common law states create a ‘deferred community property’ system, with the
concept of marital property becoming effective upon divorce.”); Elizabeth R. Carter, The Illusion
of Equality: The Failure of the Community Property Reform to Achieve Management Equality, 48
IND. L. REV. 853, 860 (2015); see also Laura W. Morgan & Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters:
Transmutation and the Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 335, 336–38
(2003).
79. See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 65, 84 (1998). To be sure, what constitutes an adequate level of support depends upon the
wealth of the household. See Elizabeth Katz, Marital Financial Duties ch. 1 (May 17, 2019)
(unpublished dissertation chapter) (on file with the Maryland Law Review). But as support is set
on the level of merchant and judicial discretion, it is hard to conceive of as a poorer spouse’s
property right.
80. See Carter, supra note 78, at 862 (2015) (noting that because “separate property states do
not contemplate the automatic concurrent ownership of property during marriage,” “spouses must
take some affirmative step to cause title to property to be in both of their names”).
81. Id. at 887; Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying ERISA’s
Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 61, 62–64 (2009).
82. Carrillo, supra note 29, at 314.
83. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to enforce marital
obligations between still-cohabiting spouses).
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household, and not for the courts to determine.”84 The longstanding doctrine
of necessaries, which requires spouses to supply one another with the
“necessaries” of life, bypasses courts in the first instance by enabling one
spouse to pledge another’s credit to purchase such goods as food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care.85 But this doctrine imposes only an amorphous and
indirect duty of support, for it works only to the extent that a third party is
willing to extend credit to a poorer spouse, and only in an amount sufficient
to meet the spouse’s basic needs.86 Although there are good reasons for the
state to stay out of midgame property relations,87 family law’s deference to
title, combined with courts’ refusal to intervene before divorce, means that
spouses effectively hold and use property beyond state supervision.88 In
common-law states, there is no default marital property during marriage.89
Although most spouses share resources as a factual matter, if they do not, the
poorer spouse has limited property rights unless and until a couple divorces.
Although spouses in community property jurisdictions own community
property jointly during marriage, title still matters, for community property
management rules permit titleholders great leeway to unilaterally control
community assets.90 Historically, husbands enjoyed the sole right to manage
community property, and although this privilege has been abolished on
gender-equality grounds, the most common replacement management rules
do not require joint action.91 Eight community property jurisdictions employ
“equal management” as a default rule,92 but “[n]early every valuable asset is
84. Id. at 342.
85. See HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 189–92 (1968); Margaret M.
Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage: Equal Protection, Spousal Support and the
Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAM. L. 221, 231 (1983).
86. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV.
537, 560 (1996).
87. See Strauss, supra note 46, at 1264 (describing marital duties as “imperfect” and arguing
that legal enforcement thereof “displac[es] spouses’ discretion and commitment”). But see Frances
E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 835 (1985).
88. See Carter, supra note 78, at 854 (“The practical and predictable consequence of” commonlaw states’ “hands-off approach” to marital property management “is that existing gender economic
inequities are simply brought home.”).
89. Cf. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 564 (stating that “equitable distribution laws
in common law states create a ‘deferred community property’ system, with the concept of marital
property becoming effective upon divorce”).
90. Carter, supra note 78, at 854.
91. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981); WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34,
at 225–26 (describing history of husband’s managerial privileges); Susan Westerberg Prager, The
Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California’s Community Property System, 18491975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 70–71 (1976).
92. Carter, supra note 78, at 878 (“Equal management is the default rule of management in
every state except Texas.”). Under this rule, “either spouse, acting alone,” may “manage any aspect
of the community property without the consent of the other spouse.” Id. at 877. This rule rests on
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governed by” an “exception[].” 93 Although joinder, or the consent of both
spouses, is required to manage community real property,94 as a practical
matter each spouse enjoys “exclusive management over virtually every item
of valuable personal property that is associated with his or her name.”95 Not
only do “[v]ehicles and business equity . . . typically . . . fall under the
exclusive management” of the titleholding spouse, but so do checking and
savings accounts, money market accounts, and retirement accounts.96 And
since “financial institutions operate according to . . . federal and state laws
and internal procedures that rarely . . . consider . . . community property
rights,”97 individually titling a financial account can effectively preclude a
spouse from accessing community funds.98 Even in community property
jurisdictions, spouses remain free to control most property titled in their
names as they see fit—and to title property individually in the first instance.99
Because community property management rules frequently devolve to title,
richer spouses who so desire can individually control the lion’s share of
family resources, even in these more egalitarian jurisdictions.
Because the forty-one common-law jurisdictions do little to require
sharing during marriage, married spouses living in these states are situated
similarly to cohabitants. And although spouses in the other nine states own
community property jointly, equal enjoyment of these resources is by no
means assured. Thus the conjugal period is one in which the incidents of
ownership follow title, a state of affairs that can tend to the detriment of the
less propertied spouse.100 Not only does this baseline approach incentivize
an egalitarian but flawed premise: that spouses will consult and come to agreement before managing
property. Id.
93. Id. at 882.
94. Id. at 878 (“The joinder requirements that exist today . . . do not reflect any attempt by
legislatures to increase the wife’s participation in a couple’s financial decisions,” but rather “seem
to contradict the assumption of consultation and agreement upon which the equal management rule
was premised because they assume that joinder is needed to ensure that both spouses have a voice
in particular financial decisions.”).
95. Id. at 881; see also id. (“[I]t is apparent that ‘equal management’ in the sense of equal and
separate power in each spouse to alienate, encumber, or lease any community asset independently
will exist as a matter of law in relatively few instances.”) (quoting Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana’s
1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53 TUL. L. REV. 105 (1978))).
96. Id. at 882–83.
97. Id. at 884.
98. See id. at 885–86 (“A spouse whose name is not on an individual [financial] account simply
has no right to access the funds in that account short of a court order.”) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 330.6
(2015))).
99. Id. at 884 (“Spouses are free to deposit their earnings and other community funds into any
combination of joint accounts and individual accounts that they see fit and research shows that they
most often do so in a manner that is detrimental to the wife.”).
100. Id. at 854–55 (“Today, wives in community property states have no better rights than wives
in separate property states. In some cases, their economic position may even be worse.”); see also
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individual property holding during marriage, but it also limits family law’s
ability to achieve sharing outcomes on divorce.
2. The Separate Property Logic of Equitable Distribution
While cohabitants and spouses are similarly situated during marriage,
especially in common-law jurisdictions, the law treats them dramatically
differently at the moment of divorce, when spouses’ consent to marriage
provides the special justification needed for family law to distribute property
regardless of title. Courts in common-law states are instructed to construct a
shared “marital estate,” value it, and distribute it between spouses after
considering a number of equitable criteria. Courts in community property
states begin with the community estate, but also distribute it equitably.101
Although equitable distribution establishes former spouses’ entitlements in
derogation of title, it does so through a process that incorporates separate
property assumptions. As a result, divorce distributions tend to favor titular
owners and income earners, reinscribing rather than remedying property
inequalities between spouses.102 In this way, divorce distribution is the
exception that proves the rule of title-based ownership.
Today’s equitable distribution schemes had their origins in the divorce
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s.103 Under the common-law title system, each
spouse left the marriage with the assets titled in his or her own name, which
in practice allowed breadwinning husbands to claim the majority of marital

Jeffrey Dew, Sonya Britt & Sandra Huston, Examining the Relationship Between Financial Issues
and Divorce, 61 FAM. RELATIONS 615, 617 (2012) (“Regardless of how money is earned outside
the home, only a minority of households manage money within the home in ways that equitably
benefit both women and men.”) (emphasis omitted).
101. Community property is jointly owned during marriage, but in most states divided equitably
upon divorce. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 628 n.22, 632, 632 n.38
(1991) [hereinafter Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry]; J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the
Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 99 (1993). Thus, the
infirmities of equitable distribution infect divorce distributions in both common law and community
property jurisdictions.
102. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 17 (arguing that marital property regimes enshrine formal
equality at the cost of substantive equality); WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 365–66 (arguing that nofault divorce law fails to adequately account for inequality between husbands and wives during
marriage); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
291, 309 (1987) (calling for reforms “to prevent financial and emotional harm to spouses whose
choices were made . . . in light of more traditional expectations about the roles of women and men”);
Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249, 253
(1999) [hereinafter Williams, Do Wives Own Half?] (describing a family property “system that is
inconsistent with our commitment to gender equality[] and leads to the widespread impoverishment
of mothers and the children who depend on them”).
103. Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 101, at 629–31.
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resources.104 Equitable distribution enabled courts to allocate property
without regard to title, and thus provided “a means of achieving economic
equity between divorcing spouses.”105
Common-law jurisdictions’ equitable distribution schemes work by
constructing a jointly owned marital estate to be distributed upon divorce.106
Equitable distribution generally requires a judge to (1) identify the marital
assets and liabilities subject to division; (2) value them; and (3) distribute
them between the spouses after considering a set of criteria enumerated by
statute or articulated through case law.107 Reflecting the labor-based
“partnership theory” of marriage,108 equitable distribution schemes were
meant to recognize and reward homemakers’ nonmonetary contributions to
the family.109 But because title-based conceptions of ownership permeate
both the identification and distribution steps, these schemes are limited in
their ability to deviate from market distributions.
Separate property logic is most obvious in the first step of equitable
distribution, in which courts identify which assets and liabilities are marital
property subject to distribution. Under partnership theory, only “the fruits of
spouses’ labor during . . . marriage” are subject to marital sharing; all other
assets remain the separate property of the individual spouse.110 This means
that in most states, property acquired either before marriage or during
marriage by gift or bequest is “separate” and excluded from the marital estate
or community.111
104. See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 563–64; see also Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 926 (Miss. 1994) (en banc) (“Our separate property system at times
resulted in unjust distributions, especially involving cases of a traditional family where most
property was titled in the husband, leaving a traditional housewife and mother with nothing but a
claim for alimony, which often proved unenforceable.”).
105. Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 101, at 631; see also Ferguson, 639 So.
2d at 927 n.4 (stating that equitable distribution “refers to the authority of the courts to award
property legally owned by one spouse to the other spouse”).
106. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 564 (stating that “equitable distribution laws in
common law states create a ‘deferred community property’ system, with the concept of marital
property becoming effective upon divorce”).
107. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 1974).
108. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 130 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay eds., 1990) (analogizing nofault divorce to partnership law).
109. See, e.g., Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 927 n.4 (“Under the equitable distribution system, the
marriage is viewed as a partnership with both spouses contributing to the marital estate in the
manner which they have chosen.”).
110. Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1636 (2008).
111. Id. at 1631–37 (describing rules governing marital and separate property). The so-called
“hotchpot” states, which empower courts to divide all assets owned by either spouse, regardless of
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The identification step is both practically and conceptually fundamental
to the divorce distribution scheme. Identification is a high-stakes inquiry, for
it determines what property is subject to distribution. At the same time,
classifying property as separate or marital can be complicated.112 The
“marital” or “coverture” period can be difficult to define, 113 while separate
property can become marital through “commingling” with marital assets,114
active management during marriage,115 or a pattern of family use.116
Although most states presume that property is marital unless proven
otherwise,117 separate property’s payoff can be so great that wealthier couples
often devote extensive efforts to drawing the lines between “yours,” “mine,”
and “ours.”
As a conceptual matter, the identification step exposes important
limitations of the marital property construct. Because partnership theory
revolves around labor, only certain kinds of property are subject to sharing.118
Wages accrue to the marital estate, but capital, including human or social
capital, often does not.119 Yet capital assets tend to be disproportionately
when or how they were acquired, are an important exception. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra
note 34, at 565. But, as one commentator has noted, “even [these] states seem . . . inclined to award
‘separate’ property to the owning spouse.” J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and
Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 220 (1989).
112. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, A Theory for “Just” Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
41 MO. L. REV. 165, 173–74 (1976) (“The ABA Family Law Section . . . feared the necessity of
using complex . . . principles to distinguish between marital and separate property.”).
113. See, e.g., Antognini, supra note 18, at 8–9; Joslin, supra note 27, at 974–76 (discussing
“interstitial marriage cases”); Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1254
(2015). Compare Estate of Mortner v. Thompson, 182 A.3d 1260 (N.H. 2018), with Estate of
Albrecht v. Albrecht, 908 N.W.2d 135 (N.D. 2018) (two recent death-during-divorce-proceeding
cases with opposed outcomes).
114. See, e.g., Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 53 (D.C. 2013) (stating that “property may be
changed or transformed such that it loses its character as ‘property acquired prior to the marriage’”);
see generally Oldham, supra note 111.
115. See generally Suzanne Reynolds, Increases in Separate Property and the Evolving Marital
Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 241 (1989).
116. See Allgood v. Allgood, 62 So. 3d 443, 447 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52
So. 3d 430, 438 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Hankins v. Hankins, 866 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. Ct. App.
2004).
117. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(3) (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330(3) (2019);
see also UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1983)
(“All property of spouses is presumed to be marital property.”).
118. See, e.g., Motro, supra note 110, at 1636 (“Because property acquired prior to marriage
and gifts and bequests received during marriage do not result from the fruits of spouses’ labor
during the marriage, partnership theory classifies them as external to the marriage.”) (emphasis
added).
119. See id. at 1625 (“Many gifts and inheritances are not the result of pure altruism, but rather
reflect . . . an unarticulated exchange . . . . Most often, earnings reflect a combination of past and
current labor, as well as . . . [a]n individual’s education, cultural fluency, and professional contacts
accessed through social and familial networks.”); Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership
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valuable and disproportionately owned by husbands.120
Rightly or
wrongly,121 the identification step insulates a potentially significant body of
resources from the marital corpus. Although intended to consider property
regardless of title, the identification step can be highly protective of
individual property rights.
Regard for separate property also shapes the third and final step of
property division, distribution, through that stage’s focus on contribution.
Although a few states mandate an equal distribution of marital property, most
states—including community property jurisdictions—instruct courts to
weigh a variety of factors and arrive at “just” or “equitable” results.122 These
criteria reflect a number of concerns, including the spouses’ respective
economic circumstances, but the dominant principle is one of contribution.123
Although intended to “take account of a spouse’s non-financial
contribution[s]” to a marriage, which “are often considerable,”124
contribution-based reasoning tends to incorporate the conjugal period’s
separate property approach. By crediting spouses with “their” contributions,
equitable distribution schemes assume that each spouse held discrete and preexisting entitlements in “his” or “her” income and household labor.125 This
is hardly surprising, given that throughout the marriage ownership followed
title.126 But this assumption is faulty at the time of divorce, because against
Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV.
59, 62 (2001) (“Overwhelmingly . . . , courts have rejected the notion that a career asset can be
jointly acquired and jointly owned. Instead, the spouse who possesses the enhanced career . . . is
treated as the separate owner of the asset.”).
120. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 119, at 77, 93–94.
121. Some argue that, in the absence of separate property, wealthy individuals would forgo
marriage and simply cohabit. On this account, protecting separate property is justified as an
incentive to marriage. On the other hand, wealthier individuals are currently more likely to marry
than poorer individuals—and to marry other wealthy individuals. See generally JUNE CARBONE &
NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(2014).
122. See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1872 (2012);
Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227,
1234–36. But even in the case of equitable distribution, some scholars argue that the baseline
presumption is equal ownership of marital property. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges
Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV.
401 (1996). But see Williams, Do Wives Own Half?, supra note 102, at 250 (describing an exception
in cases with large marital estates); Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (taking “husband’s genius” into account in distribution).
123. See FINEMAN, supra note 17, at 40–42.
124. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 926 (Miss. 1994).
125. Consider the revealing language of one court in describing the net value of a business
developed over a twenty-three-year marriage: “[P]lacing the husband’s marital estate at
$10,100,000 and the entire marital estate at $13,600,000 does not automatically mean that the wife
is entitled to half that total sum.” Lester, 547 So. 2d at 1242.
126. See supra notes 74, 78–79 and accompanying text.
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the backdrop of an ostensibly joint property moment, neither spouse had
individualized rights in marital property prior to its distribution. 127 Rather
than committing fully to the idea of shared marital property, the distribution
stage continues to rely upon title-based conceptions of property ownership.
By presupposing the answer to the very question it is supposed to consider,
contribution-based reasoning injects separate property logic into the
distribution process.128
The results of this subtler form of property individualism, an example
of what Reva Siegel has called “preservation-through-transformation,”129 can
be economically significant. Contribution-based reasoning tends to favor
those who generated financial assets, for market forces shape both the
substance and the value of spouses’ “inputs” into a marriage. Because
women’s employment opportunities are limited and their earnings are
depressed in comparison to men’s, women are more likely to perform
caretaking and household labor than men are.130
These “in-kind”
contributions are not only difficult to value because they occur “outside” the
marketplace, but are also devalued because they were traditionally women’s
work.131 As a result, marital property division continues to advantage
titleholders and breadwinners over caretakers, who may receive less than
fifty percent of the (potentially already circumscribed) marital estate.132
127. Cf. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 564 (stating that “in common law
states . . . the concept of marital property becom[es] effective upon divorce”); Ira Mark Ellman, The
Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1989) (stating that “any theory of property division
would have to generate principles for balancing claims based on title against claims based on equity,
as well as a basis for allocating title in the first place”).
128. See Ellman, supra note 127, at 12 (“In actual operation, most divisions of property in
‘equitable distribution’ states today probably involve an unarticulated blend of title and equity
principles.”); id. at 12 n.26 (stating that “even in their division of marital property, the common law
states often consider traditional title or ownership principles in deciding what division is
‘equitable’”).
129. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2178–87 (1996); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (1997) (“[T]he
effort to disestablish a body of status law can produce changes that modernize its rule structure and
justificatory rhetoric. . . . [B]ut they will also enhance the legal system’s capacity to justify
regulation that perpetuates inequalities among status-differentiated groups.”).
130. Allison Daminger, The Cognitive Dimension of Household Labor, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 609,
609 (2019) (suggesting that division of “cognitive labor” is a “source of gender inequality at the
household level”); Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1414, 1422, 1437–38 (2015)
(highlighting the disparity between men’s and women’s contributions to household labor);
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3, 8
(1996) (noting that women “spend significantly more time on housework than do men”).
131. See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Afterword: A Feminist Response to the Gender Gap in
Compensation Symposium, 82 GEO. L.J. 147, 151–52 (1993).
132. See Williams, Do Wives Own Half?, supra note 102, at 250 (arguing that the bigger the
marital pot, the lesser the percentage that the wife receives); see also Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett
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For an illustration, consider the case of Wendt v. Wendt.133 The spouses,
the CEO of General Electric Capital Services and a homemaker, were
married for thirty-one years.134 The husband, who valued the marital estate
at $30–40 million, offered the wife $8.3 million in property plus $250,000
per year in alimony. 135 The wife, who valued the estate at $90 million,
demanded half.136 Although rejecting the principle that “enough is
enough,”137 the court declared that Connecticut law does not require a
presumption of equal division on its way to awarding the wife much less than
half of the marital estate.138 A recent empirical study finding that respondents
“consistently favor” a working husband over a stay-at-home wife “in
distributing” such a “couple’s assets” suggests that the Wendt judges’
approach is no outlier.139 Although the legal construct of contribution has
cemented homemakers’ claims to some marital assets, Lockean notions of
individual desert continue to color property distributions upon divorce.
Because marital property regimes hew so closely to formal title, their
ability to achieve distributions in derogation thereof is limited. The
identification step can exclude significant individually titled assets from the
marital corpus, while contribution-based reasoning makes assumptions about
ownership that predetermine the answers to the very questions the
distribution process sets out to ask. In these ways, divorce distribution is the
exception that proves the rule of separate property. And because equitable
distribution incorporates rather than challenges individualistic conceptions of
property ownership, divorce awards are influenced by and reflect broader
socioeconomic patterns.
As a result, those who are structurally
disadvantaged in the market are doubly disadvantaged under marital property
regimes. Because equitable distribution law’s ability to deviate from titlebased principles of ownership is limited, its approach to sharing is
importantly circumscribed.

Shinall, When Equitable Is Not Equal: Experimental Evidence on the Division of Marital Assets in
Divorce, 18 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 655, 658 (2020) (finding that survey respondents consistently
favor breadwinners over caretakers).
133. No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 757 A.2d
1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
134. Id. at *1.
135. Id. at *43.
136. Id. at *42.
137. Id. at *42–50; see also Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past,
Present and Future, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 807, 873, 873 n.289 (1990) (suggesting based upon a series
of interviews with Connecticut divorce attorneys that “the more there is, the smaller the percentage
the non-propertied spouse receives”).
138. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165, at *52.
139. Hersch & Shinall, supra note 132, at 658.
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3. Clean-Break Norms and Alimony
Like the law of intact marriages and divorce distribution, modern
alimony law reflects and reinscribes the premise that family law’s
distributions in derogation of title are exceptional and limited. The cleanbreak norms of no-fault divorce insist that former spouses’ financial ties are
to be severed as soon as possible after they separate. Recent state statutory
reforms further emphasize that each spouse has the strong default right to
exclude the other from his or her post-dissolution earnings. The 2017
rescission of alimony’s tax-deductible status likewise underscores the
individual nature of post-divorce property ownership. With modern spousal
support regimes so limited, title reasserts itself with a vengeance after
divorce. Marital sharing is thus restricted in duration, as well as in scope,
even though the economic effects of marriage are not so neatly limited to the
conjugal period.
Alimony, or a “court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the
other . . . for maintenance and support” during separation or after divorce,
originated as the wife’s sole remedy upon legal separation.140 Since such
ecclesiastical divorces “from bed and board” did not sever marital bonds, the
husband retained the couple’s property and was required to support the wife
from it.141 As civil divorce “from the ‘chains of matrimony’” became more
common, English courts ceased to distinguish between legal separations and
absolute divorces and began to award alimony in both causes of action.142
U.S. states followed suit when they passed absolute divorce statutes in the
nineteenth century.143
Since the divorce reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, alimony has become
increasingly disfavored.144 Modern domestic relations doctrine attempts to
provide for economically vulnerable ex-spouses through marital property
division, rather than ongoing post-divorce transfer payments.145 When courts
do order spousal support, these awards tend to take some form of short-term
alimony, whether aimed at economically rehabilitating a former spouse,
140. Alimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Garrison, Good Intentions
Gone Awry, supra note 101, at 623 (describing alimony as “the traditional entitlement of a divorced
wife”).
141. Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment
Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 28–29 (2001); see also Garrison,
Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 101, at 623 (describing alimony as “the traditional
entitlement of a divorced wife”).
142. Collins, supra note 141, at 28, 30.
143. Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry, supra note 101, at 626.
144. Id. at 628–32.
145. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-910(b)(4) (2016) (requiring courts to consider “whether the
[property] distribution is in lieu of or in addition to alimony”).
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providing restitution for relationship-specific investment, or easing the
financial transition to post-divorce life.146 Some states have also imposed
durational limits on long-term or “permanent” alimony.147 These changes all
reflect the “clean break” norms of no-fault divorce, which emphasize
severing former family members’ financial ties.148
The strong presumption against shifting post-marital income marks an
individual’s resources as “his” or “her” own after divorce, reinstating the
title-based separate property regime that existed before (and in most states
during) marriage. Although it seems natural to consider post-divorce income
as belonging to the ex-spouse to whom it is paid,149 this perception is a
construction of modern spousal support law, which is making a particular
policy choice: to elevate the logic of individual contribution over norms of
spousal cooperation and sharing.150 The post-divorce reassertion of what
Joan Williams has called the “‘he who earns it, owns it’ rule” further
demonstrates family law’s individualistic approach to property.151 As a
practical matter, the decreased availability of spousal support means that
wage-earners keep the lion’s share of their post-divorce income, while
caretaker spouses tend to bear a disproportionate share of the lifelong career
costs associated with parenting and household maintenance.

146. Stolzenberg, supra note 28, at 2034–35 (“Since the no-fault divorce revolution, states have
moved toward alimony regimes in which judges choose between different kinds of time-limited
awards, all of which are meant to assist a poorer spouse in attaining post-divorce financial
independence.”); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23(b) (2018) (allowing courts to award
permanent, rehabilitative, limited duration, or reimbursement alimony); In re Marriage of Becker,
756 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 2008) (describing purposes of various kinds of alimony).
147. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(b), (f) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23(c)
(2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (2019). Some states also have presumptions against
alimony. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.053 (2019).
148. Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 35 (2015) (“The law of divorce . . . has
come to privilege . . . a ‘clean break,’ with each party returning to the marketplace to make his
way.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
687, 704 (1994) (describing no-fault divorce law’s “‘clean break’ policy”).
149. The president of the advocacy group Massachusetts Alimony Reform, for example, likens
alimony to “indentured servitude.” Christian M. Wade, Advocates Want Lawmakers to Revisit
Alimony
Law,
MASS.
ALIMONY
REFORM
BLOG
(July
3,
2017),
https://www.massalimonyreform.org/blog/2017/7/3/advocates-want-lawmakers-to-revisitalimony-law.
150. Cf. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2257–58 (1994) (arguing that a husband’s earnings should be considered a family wage rather
than his individual income); supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text; see also Margaret F.
Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q.
93, 95 (1997) (“As the economist sees it, alimony ‘frozen’ in time . . . is simply another form of
property.”).
151. Williams, Do Wives Own Half?, supra note 102, at 249.

652

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:627

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017’s repeal of the alimony deduction
makes the clean-break norms of modern divorce law especially clear.152
Previously, alimony was tax-deductible for the payer and taxable to the
recipient, meaning that it was usually taxed at a lower income bracket.153
This rule approximated the treatment of income in an intact marriage, in
which the total income of spouses electing to file jointly was treated as a
family wage, spread across both spouses as a single earning unit, which could
result in a lower rate of taxation.154 But the Act eliminates the tax
deductibility of alimony payments made according to divorce decrees entered
or separation agreements executed after December 31, 2018.155 By treating
alimony as income to the earner and not to the ex-spouse, the law
conceptualizes alimony as a gift between unrelated parties,156 rather than as
income shared between former family members—thereby emphasizing that
divorce reasserts a title-based regime of separate property. The Act’s
practical effect, of course, is to further disincentivize generous alimony
payments by decreasing the amount of income available for transfer.
***
As this Part has shown, the family property system revolves around title
for cohabitants and spouses alike. Cohabitants live the entire course of their
relationships under a default separate property regime, while common-law
marital property regimes are likewise built upon a foundation of separate
property rights. Family law’s repeated attention to title reveals the marital
and nonmarital property systems to be structurally similar, with their
differences being of degree, rather than kind. Individualism drives the laws
of both marital and nonmarital property and produces predictable distortions
in both.
If we seek to decrease the degree of property asymmetry between
spouses and at least some cohabitants, then we need to interrogate family
law’s approach to property. At first blush, family law’s protective stance
toward individual property rights might seem consistent with foundational
152. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97, § 11051, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089–90.
153. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 504, DIVORCED OR SEPARATED INDIVIDUALS 13
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p504—2018.pdf.
154. See, e.g., id. at 4 (advising dual-income married couples to calculate their “tax on both a
joint return and separate returns . . . to see which” filing status yields “the lower combined tax”).
155. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97, § 11051, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089–90 (“Repeal
of Deduction for Alimony Payments”); id. § 11051(c)(1); see also id. § 11051(c)(2) (providing that
the Act also applies to pre-existing agreements and decrees modified after December 31, 2018 “if
the modification expressly provides that the amendments . . . apply”).
156. Gifts in amounts up to the annual exclusion rate of $15,000 are taxable to the donor, not the
recipient.
See
Frequently
Asked
Questions
on
Gift
Taxes,
IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-questions-ongift-taxes (last visited May 23, 2021).
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notions of private property.157 But as the next Part explains, nothing in nonfamily property law requires family law’s absolutist, individualistic approach
to property. Instead, property law sometimes conducts a more nuanced
consideration of intimate relationships’ distributional consequences than
family law doctrine currently undertakes.
II. INTIMACY IN PROPERTY LAW
In non-family property disputes, title is the beginning, but not always
the end, of the inquiry. Property law sometimes looks beyond title by
granting entitlements on other bases, including labor, use, and reliance.158
Property law also frequently limits titleholders’ prerogatives by constraining
their ability to exclude others from, as well as by limiting the ways in which
they can use, their property.159 This flexible approach to title allows property
law to balance promoting owners’ autonomy with furthering other important
values and interests.160
Scholars recognize that property law sometimes looks beyond title and
curbs titleholder discretion, but they disagree about the frequency and
meaning of these limits. “Essentialist” theorists, who identify the owner’s
right to exclude as the core of property, consider these limits to be
exceptional.161 In contrast, “progressive” theorists argue that these limits
reveal property law’s defining characteristic, its use to structure social
relationships.162 This lively debate about property’s meaning and purposes
reflects the multifaceted nature of property law, which comprises a
multiplicity of institutions structured to pursue diverse and incommensurable
values.163
In conversation with these theories, I argue that one of the values that
property law recognizes and pursues is intimacy. An examination of property
doctrine shows that the right to exclude from a given resource varies across
relationships. A right that is good against a stranger may not always hold
with the same strength against a neighbor, a co-owner, or an heir. These
157. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009)
(describing the “common conception of property as protection of individual control over valuable
resources” as “both intuitively and legally powerful” and “extremely influential in discussions of
property rights in the United States”); see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 30; LAURA S.
UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003).
158. See infra Part II.A.1.
159. See infra Part II.A.2.
160. See infra notes 164–166 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 231–234 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 235–242 and accompanying text.
163. See DAGAN, supra note 21, at xi.
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relationships are marked by mutual dependence, interdependence, and
vulnerability—in other words, intimacy. Property law responds to the social
facts of close, complex relationships by adjusting the incidents of ownership
accordingly. Under this approach, which I describe as instantiating a
“spectrum of intimacy,” an owner’s prerogatives may depend in part upon
his or her relationship with a particular property claimant. Property’s
occasional willingness to blunt the hard edges of owners’ prerogatives in the
service of other values, including social ones, demonstrates forcefully that
absolutist individualism is not the only model of property rights available to
family property law.
A. Limits in Property Law
Even a brief examination of property law reveals a far more qualified
approach to title than that employed by family law. Title is relative in
property law,164 an approach that allows for greater flexibility in resolving
disputes over resources.165 This flexibility is necessary because property law
is used to distribute access to a wide range of valuable goods, many of which
are required for the continuation of biological and social life.166 Property law
employs two main strategies to mediate the inevitable, varied, and often highstakes conflicts between competing interests: (1) assigning rights to titular
non-owners on grounds other than title, and (2) leaving title intact but
limiting the uses to which owners may put their property. Through these
mechanisms, entitlements can be adjusted in light of other important social
values and interests.
1. Rights in Derogation of Title
Although ownership generally follows title in property law, the two
concepts sometimes diverge. A number of doctrines establish property rights
in titular non-owners to reward labor, protect use, or recognize reliance—
even at the expense of the formal titleholder. These doctrines’ flexible
approach to title allows property law to balance owners’ autonomy against
both systemic concerns, such as encouraging productive use of resources and
quieting old claims, as well as moral considerations, including desert,
reliance, personhood, and vulnerability.
164. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 164 (4th ed. 2018) (stating that “title to property is relative, not absolute”).
165. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 476 (2011) (calling
“flexibility . . . a dynamic that any supposed Blackstonian may have every reason to value”).
166. Alexander, Peñalver, Singer & Underkuffler, supra note 157, at 744
(“Property . . . allocates scarce resources that are necessary for human life, development, and
dignity.”)
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The most notable example of property law deviating from title to reward
labor is the doctrine of accession, but easements by estoppel and adverse
possession also take labor into consideration. Reasoning that individuals
should be entitled to enjoy the fruits of their efforts, these bodies of law
vindicate a Lockean theory of desert.167 By protecting labor, these doctrines
also encourage the productive use of resources.
Under the doctrine of accession, a good faith occupant of another’s
property gains title to that property by substantially transforming it.168 Labor
not only provides the test for substantial transformation, but also dictates the
original owner’s remedy. First, the kind or extent of an occupant’s labor
determines who takes title to the improved chattel. In his discussion of
accession, Blackstone cites approvingly the Roman law examples of
“chang[ing]” a thing “into a different species”— specifically, the “making
wine, oil, or bread” from “another’s grapes, olives, or wheat”—via
manufacturing processes that involved significant human effort in
preindustrial times.169 In modern times, the degree to which labor has
increased an article’s market value decides between the original owner’s and
improving occupant’s claims. In Wetherbee v. Green, for example, the
Michigan Supreme Court declared that
the question, how much the property or labor of each has
contributed to make it what it is, must always be one of first
importance. The owner of a beam built into the house of another
loses his property in it, because the beam is insignificant in
value . . . as compared to that to which it has become attached, and
the musical instrument belongs to the maker . . . because in
bringing it to its present condition the value of the labor has
swallowed up and rendered insignificant the value of the original
materials.170
And because sufficiently transformational labor legally extinguishes the
original thing, it limits the original owner’s remedy to money damages for

167. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, §§ 25-51l, at 285–302 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that because we own our bodies and labor, we
can come to own unowned things by mixing our labor with them); see also Richard A. Epstein,
Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1226–29 (1979).
168. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 313–14, 321 (1871); see also Silsbury v. McCoon,
3 N.Y. 379, 385–86 (1850) (stating that “if the chattel wrongfully taken, afterwards come into the
hands of an innocent holder who believing himself to be the owner, converts the chattel into a thing
of different species so that its identity is destroyed, the original owner cannot reclaim it”).
169. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404.
170. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320; see also id. at 313, 321 (concluding that the defendant, whose
labor transformed timber allegedly worth $25 into barrel hoops worth close to $700, “appear[ed] to
have given the timber in its present condition nearly all of its value” and was therefore entitled to a
new trial to prove good faith conversion).
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the value of the unimproved property.171 In this way, the doctrine of
accession rewards the right kind of labor by effecting a transfer of title to the
laborer.
Labor also does secondary explanatory work in doctrines that rest more
recognizably on other principles. Cases in which courts declare easements
by estoppel often rest not only on claimants’ reliance upon a right-of-way,
but also on their efforts to improve it. 172 Similarly, while adverse possession
follows from a period of hostile use of another’s land, that use must be
productive to be qualifying.173 Here, too, labor plays a role in cementing
property rights, even in derogation of title.
Property law also sometimes deviates from title to protect nontitleholders’ use of resources. The doctrines of adverse possession,
prescriptive easements, and easements implied from prior use all transfer
entitlements from record owners to non-titled property users. The doctrine
of customary right, on the other hand, prevents titleholders from interfering
with certain customary uses of their unimproved property by others. These
doctrines simultaneously encourage the productive use of resources and
stabilize longstanding uses, both important goals of the common-law
property system.
The doctrine of adverse possession, which establishes a new chain of
title in the adverse possessor, provides the strongest example of how use can
ground property rights.174 A finding of adverse possession requires use that
is appropriate to the nature of the property possessed. “As a general rule,
either actual or constructive occupation, cultivation or residence or use is
necessary,” but “such occupancy and use is not as rigidly or literally required
in order to establish a claim . . . for land which does not lend itself to
permanent, useful improvement.”175 Although the law is sensitive to the
171. Id. at 316; see also id. at 313, 316 (explaining that granting replevin would permit the
original owner to “appropriat[e] . . . the labor and skill of the innocent occupant who wrought the
change”).
172. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Ky. 1976) (describing successful
appellees’ efforts to improve and maintain the disputed roadway).
173. See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text.
174. Under this doctrine, a claimant may wrest title to property from a record owner by showing
that his possession was “actual, exclusive, open and notorious, continuous, and adverse under a
claim of right” for a time period whose length varies by jurisdiction. THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 170 n.2 (3d ed. 2017); id. at 170 n.1 (“The
time for bringing an action to recover possession of real property varies widely from state to state,
from a low of five years to a high of 40 years.”) (citing JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION
TO PROPERTY § 4.2.6 (2001))).
175. Kayser v. Dixon, 309 So. 2d 526, 528–29 (Miss. 1975); see also Apperson v. White, 950
So. 2d 1113, 1117 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (“‘Possessory acts necessary to establish a claim of adverse
possession may vary with the characteristics of the land,’ and ‘adverse possession of “wild” or
unimproved lands may be established by evidence of acts that would be wholly insufficient in the
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character of the disputed resource, courts have held that mere recreational use
is not sufficient.176 This requirement for a minimum level of use reflects the
doctrine’s “underlying philosophy . . . that land use has historically been
favored over disuse, and that therefore he who uses land is preferred in the
law to he who does not, even though the latter is the rightful owner.”177 Under
adverse possession, productive use is so important that it trumps the idle
titleholder’s entitlement.
The doctrine of prescriptive easements also centers around and rewards
use. “The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement are” nearly
“identical with those required to prove . . . adverse possession.”178 If a party
demonstrates that his or her use of another’s property was “open, notorious,
continuous and adverse” for the required statutory period,179 then that use will
give rise to “a title by prescription.”180 The Supreme Court of California has
described the “doctrine of prescription,” like that of adverse possession, as
“aimed at ‘protecting’ and ‘stabilizing’ a long and continuous use . . . as
against the claims of an alleged ‘owner’ of the property.” 181 Use can also
play an evidentiary role in the transfer of title. In California, “continuous use
of an easement over a long period of time without the landowner’s
interference is presumptive evidence of its existence . . . .”182 Again, a
longstanding pattern of use can engender property rights.
Use also gives rise to entitlement when courts imply easements from
prior use. These easements
arise[] when there has been a ‘separation of title, a use before
separation took place which continued so long and was so obvious
or manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent,
and . . . the easement is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of
the land granted or retained.’183

case of improved or developed lands.’”) (quoting Walker v. Murphree, 722 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Miss.
Ct. App. 1998))).
176. See, e.g., Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 76, 83 (Ky. 2010) (finding activities such as
hunting, fishing, and driving over land in all-terrain vehicles insufficient to support jury verdict of
adverse possession).
177. Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 590 (Cal. 1984) (quoting Finley v.
Yuba Cnty. Water Dist., 160 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
178. Taormino v. Denny, 463 P.2d 711, 716 (Cal. 1970).
179. Warsaw, 676 P.2d at 587; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 170 n.1.
180. Taormino, 463 P.2d at 716.
181. Warsaw, 676 P.2d at 590.
182. Id. at 588.
183. Schwab v. Timmons, 589 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1999) (quoting Bullis v. Schmidt, 93 N.W.2d
476, 478–79 (Wis. 1958)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.12
(AM. L. INST. 2000); id. § 2.11 cmt. d.
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Although this kind of easement relies on contractual reasoning, inferring the
parties’ intent to convey an easement from a pattern of use, its stated goal and
effect is to protect a usage upon which enjoyment of the dominant estate
depends.184
While adverse possession and easements tend to protect use by discrete
individuals,185 the doctrine of customary right protects any person engaged
in certain longstanding uses of land. Protection for hunting provides one
example. In 1818, the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina
declared the “right to hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated lands” to be
“clearly established.”186 Not only was the right described as “universally
exercised from the first settlement of the country up to the present time,” the
court also defended the usage as necessary to both subsistence and the
militia’s readiness.187 Over one hundred years later, the United States
Supreme Court similarly concluded that a “license may be implied from” the
“common understanding with regard to the large expanses of unenclosed and
uncultivated land in many parts . . . of this country . . . [o]ver [which] it is
customary to wander, shoot and fish at will until the owner sees fit to prohibit
it.”188 Although the usage holds less sway in modern times, its influence is
clear in states with so-called “posting laws.”189 Rural landowners in these
jurisdictions can exclude hunters if they choose, but doing so requires them
to take the affirmative step of “prominently” displaying “‘No Hunting’ or
‘No Trespassing’ signs” on their property.190 Public access to beaches and
the European “right to roam” are similarly founded on principles of
customary use.191
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.11 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(“The inference is based on the conclusion that, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer
that the parties intended to create a servitude but failed to give full expression to their intent.”).
185. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 983 (“Very roughly speaking, an easement is
functionally like a contract in which an owner agrees to waive his or her right to exclude certain
kinds of intrusions by another and give the other a right to use . . . .”); id. at 986 (“An easement . . . is
regarded as an irrevocable conveyance of the right to engage in a particular use of land.”).
186. McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. 244, 351–52 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1818).
187. Id.
188. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
189. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 371 n.1; Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the
Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 951 (2013); Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting and Posting on
Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 584 (2004) (“Twenty-nine states currently require
private landowners to post their land to exclude hunters . . . .”).
190. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 371–72 (“These laws impose an affirmative burden
of notification on the possessor of land in order to assert the right to exclude. If the owner does not
make the required notification, then the right to exclude is subordinated to the customary right to
hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated land owned by another.”).
191. Oregon ex rel. Thompson v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673–75 (Or. 1969) (longstanding public
use of beaches limited owners’ rights to exclude); David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s
Edges, 60 B.C. L. REV. 753, 771 n.86 (2019) (“[T]he law in Scotland and Sweden . . . allows public
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Finally, property law also deviates from title to protect non-owners’
reliance interests vis-à-vis a particular resource.192 The most obvious
example is the doctrine of easements by estoppel, but adverse possession has
also been justified in these terms. Because of their nature, reliance-based
entitlements present the clearest illustration of the role that moral intuitions
can play in property law.
An easement by estoppel arises from a user’s reliance on an owner’s
“permission” for or “acquiescence” to a use of his or her property.193 In
Kentucky, for example, reliance on “a license . . . to erect structures” gives
rise to “an interest . . . in the nature of an easement,”194 “a grant through
estoppel.”195 So strong is the reliance interest that the time period for adverse
possession need not have passed for a license to become irrevocable.196
Rather, the Kentucky Supreme Court has reasoned that, once permission is
given and relied upon, “[i]t would be unconscionable to permit the owner[]
. . . to revoke the license by obstructing and preventing its use.”197 The
language of unconscionability reflects a moral judgment that, at least in cases
where the user’s reliance interest is great as compared to the owner’s loss,198
individuals should be able to depend on and order their lives around certain
kinds of representations made by others.199
Although as a doctrinal matter adverse possession turns mainly on
use,200 it is commonly justified in terms of protecting “the reliance interests
that the possessor may have developed through longstanding possession of

access on unimproved, private land for ‘roaming’ while making actionable any intrusion into
cultivated areas and the area around a home, which the Swedish label the ‘tomt.’”); see also Heidi
Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private Land for Walking: Environmental and Individual
Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting the Right to Exclude, 23 GEO. INT’L ENV’T. L. REV. 211,
215 (2011); Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665,
684–88 (2011).
192. Davidson, supra note 165, at 452 (“[P]roperty law does recognize expectations, albeit
sometimes with barely a nod before trampling reliance and at other times by providing very strong
protection.”)
193. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 1002 n.3.
194. Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Ky. 1976) (quoting Lashley Telephone Co. v.
Durbin, 228 S.W. 423, 423 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921)).
195. Id. at 765 (quoting McCoy v. Hoffman, 295 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956)).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Akers v. Moore, 309 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Ky. 1958)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
198. Id. (describing the land to which access was disputed as a “strip . . . of trivial value”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Cf., e.g., Davidson, supra note 165, at 476 (“As the discourse on expectation makes clear,
moral intuitions are indeed important to how people decide to approach property.”); id. at 487
(“Reliance is a normative value worth weighing[.]”).
200. See supra notes 174–177 and accompanying text.
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the property.”201 In discussing the doctrine, Holmes observed that “man, like
a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings,
and when the roots have grown up to a certain size, can’t be displaced without
cutting at his life.”202 More recent commentators have described the doctrine
as recognizing an adverse possessor’s greater personhood interests in the
property or “plac[ing] the loss on the person who will suffer it least—the
person whose roots are less vitally embedded in the land.”203
Joseph Singer has developed the most expansive account of reliancebased property entitlements.204 For Singer, not just adverse possession and
prescriptive easements, but also “rules about . . . public rights of access to
private property, tenants’ rights, equitable division of property on divorce,
[and] welfare rights” all vindicate a vulnerable party’s “[l]egitimate reliance”
on access to property.205 These doctrines further “the security of the weaker
party” in “relations of mutual dependence” by limiting “the freedom of the
stronger party to do whatever she wants with ‘her’ property.”206 Singer
argues that the law’s “choice” to deviate from titular ownership under these
circumstances reflects the “moral principle” that it is “fair” to readjust
entitlements “to protect each of the competing interests to some extent.”207
Although doctrines protecting reliance provide the clearest example of
the role of moral judgments in property law, doctrines rewarding labor and
protecting use also implicate moral principles.208 This is so because, on a
fundamental level, property law is always making hard choices about whose

201. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 172; see also Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans,
An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 166 (1995) (examining
the economic effects of protecting adverse possessors’ reliance interests).
202. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), in THE MIND AND
FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 417–18
(Max Lerner ed., 1943).
203. Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 745, 748–
49 (1986) [hereinafter Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation] (arguing from personhood theory);
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2420 (2001)
(arguing from empirical psychology).
204. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611 (1988); see also Davidson, supra note 165, at 476–77 (describing Singer’s “moral account” as
“an explication of how interdependence might be worthy of legal recognition in property despite
classic liberal conceptions of the isolated and exclusive owner”).
205. Singer, supra note 204, at 622.
206. Id. at 622–23.
207. Id. at 622–23, 663; see also Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, supra note 203, at
749 (describing the question when “the titleholder” is “detached enough and the adverse possessor
attached enough” to warrant transferring title as a “moral judgment”).
208. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1850 (2007) (arguing that “[p]roperty can function as property only if the vast preponderance
of persons recognize that property is a moral right”).
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interests to prioritize and which goals to pursue.209 Indeed, such value
judgments are inevitable in a system that governs access to the resources
necessary for biological and social life.210 By considering the labor, use, and
reliance interests of non-owners in assigning entitlements, property law can
balance owners’ prerogatives with other systemic concerns and moral values,
allowing it to pursue a range of purposes beyond titleholder autonomy.
2. Curbs on Owners’ Authority
Assigning nonowners rights to property titled in others’ name is the
exception in property law, rather than the rule. More frequently, property
law balances owners’ autonomy with competing considerations by following
title but refusing to allow owners to exercise Blackstonian exclusive
dominion over their property.211 In these cases, property law either constrains
owners’ ability to exclude others from, or limits the ways in which they can
use, their property.
For an example of the first balancing strategy, consider two exceptions
to the law of trespass: the defenses of necessity and public policy. Under the
common law, “an entry upon the land of another may be justified by
necessity,” and this principle “applies with special force to the preservation
of human life.”212 And in New Jersey, an owner’s right to exclude is weighed
against other social interests at stake in a given dispute.213 These doctrines
reflect a balancing of “individualism” with “the social interest.”214 Public
accommodation laws and antidiscrimination laws similarly limit owners’
ability to exclude others from private property open to the public in order to
protect access to the spaces of collective life.215 These constraints on owners’

209. Alexander, Peñalver, Singer & Underkuffler, supra note 157, at 743–44 (noting “the
inevitable impacts of one person’s property rights on others” and arguing that “[c]hoices about
property entitlements are unavoidable”).
210. Id. at 744 (“Property . . . allocates scarce resources that are necessary for human life,
development, and dignity.”)
211. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647, 655 (2013);
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382–85 (1993) (describing some such
limits); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987) (“In
a number of instances, . . . [t]he private preferences of individual landowners . . . are not permitted
to govern.”); see also Schorr, supra note 21, at 104 (describing how the “absolute, individualistic
view of property” came to be identified with Blackstone).
212. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
213. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values. They
are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”).
214. Id. at 373 (quoting 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 745, at 493–94
(Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1970)).
215. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 373–76, 391–92; see also Joseph William Singer,
No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1464–
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prerogatives reflect the judgment that other values can at times outweigh
individual autonomy. When owners’ use of their resources conflicts with
maintaining human life or ensuring the equal dignity of all members of
society, property law prioritizes the latter.
Examples of the second balancing strategy, constraining the uses to
which owners can put their property, include the doctrine of nuisance and
zoning regimes.216 These bodies of law share the same purpose: to prevent
land use that “injures the rights of others.”217
Nuisance law attempts this end by forbidding “unreasonable” uses of
property that prevent others from enjoying their own property.218 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts declares a use “unreasonable if . . . the gravity
of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct.”219 Although some
courts have glossed nuisance law as involving “a balancing of the
landowners’ interests,”220 the Restatement’s balancing test sweeps more
broadly, calling for a comparison of the competing uses’ value to society writ
large.221 The crux of the inquiry is the extent to which a property use
“generally advances or protects the public good.”222 Although recognizing

65 (1996) (explaining that property rights have always been “contextual, changing over time, and
dependent on the effects their exercise has on others”).
216. Zoning and nuisance can be functional equivalents. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at
1079 n.6 (describing other public tools of land-use control); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682
(1973) (arguing “that conflicts among neighboring landowners are generally better resolved by
systems less centralized than master planning and zoning”).
217. Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Wis. 1982); see also id. at 189 (noting that American
“society has increasingly regulated the use of land by the landowner for the general welfare”).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979); see also id. § 821D
(defining a private nuisance as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land”); Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 200 (W. Va. 1989) (describing a
nuisance as “a substantial and unreasonable interference with the private use and enjoyment of
another’s land”).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979); see also id. § 827
(“gravity of harm” factors include the “extent” and “character of the harm involved,” the “social
value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded,” the invaded use’s
“suitability . . . to the character of the locality,” and the “the burden on the person harmed of
avoiding the harm”); id. § 828 (“utility of conduct” factors include “the social value that the law
attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct,” its “suitability . . . to the character of the locality,”
and “the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion”). These factors “[are] not intended
to be exhaustive.” Id. § 827 cmt. b.
220. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 202 (W. Va. 1989).
221. “Social value” appears on both sides of the nuisance balancing test. Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“gravity of harm” factors include
the “social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded”), with id. § 828
(“utility of conduct” factors include “the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose
of the conduct”).
222. Id. § 828 cmt. f.
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that “there is often no uniformly acceptable scale or standard of social values
to which courts can refer,” the Restatement suggests that judges deciding
nuisance suits “consider . . . community standards,” as well as “the relative
social value of various types of human activity.”223 Thus the Restatement
recognizes that individual “freedom of conduct has some social value,”224 but
limits that freedom when conduct results in severe externalities. By
rendering “[t]he rights of neighboring landowners . . . relative,” the law of
nuisance balances owners’ autonomy with its potentially negative effects
upon others.225
More wide-ranging than nuisance law, zoning and other land-use
regulations limit the uses to which owners may put their property in order to
spatially separate incompatible uses.226 Zoning “segregat[es] . . . land uses
into different districts” by “defin[ing] classes of activities . . . that are
permitted in each geographic area” and prescribing “structural” details
ranging from “building and lot dimensions” to “matters like minimum
parking space and the use of signs.”227 Prospective compliance with these
restrictions is mandatory for landowners.228 Although commentators have
questioned the extent to which zoning regulations further the “public interest”
rather than a subset of private interests,229 it is unquestionable that zoning
represents a significant community-minded limit on individual property
rights. The prevalence of this form of regulation in the United States

223. Id. § 828 cmt. b; id. § 828 cmt. f. (“On the whole, . . . activities that are customary and
usual in the community have relatively greater social value than those that are not, and those that
produce a direct public benefit have more than those carried on primarily for the benefit of the
individual.”).
224. Id. § 828 cmt. e; see also id. (“[I]t is in the general public interest to permit the free play of
individual initiative within limits.”) (emphasis added).
225. Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Wis. 1982); see also Dyal-Chand, supra note 211,
at 687 (stating that “rights are relatively less hard-edged in nuisance law, resulting in more rhetorical
and doctrinal recognition of the need for accommodation among ‘neighbors’”) (emphasis omitted);
Singer, supra note 215, at 1464 (“Nuisance doctrine expressly qualifies property rights by reference
to their effects on other property owners and on the public at large.”).
226. See Ellickson, supra note 216, at 692.
227. Id. at 692, 766.
228. Id. at 691 (“Zoning relies . . . on . . . the imposition of mandatory standards on permitted
activities.”); id. at 692 (stating that “due to the harshness of retroactive application[,]
[n]onconforming uses and, to a greater degree, nonconforming structures that preexist zoning
restrictions are generally allowed to continue”).
229. Id. at 699 (“As it is usually operated, . . . zoning is an inequitable system . . . that . . . does
not correct the changes in wealth distribution it causes.”); id. at 696 (“In most
communities, . . . zoning ordinances are designed to promote the interests of single-family
homeowners, often a majority of the voting population.”).
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underlines the extent to which title is not the sole arbiter of entitlements in
property law.230
***
In property law, title is the beginning, but not necessarily the end, of the
question who enjoys entitlements in a given resource. Property law
sometimes limits owners’ prerogatives in the service of other ends, whether
to uphold values such as equality and dignity or to protect others’ ability to
enjoy their own property. Whether viewed as exceptions to title or inherent
curbs on owners’ property rights, these limits allow property law greater
flexibility to balance the competing interests and ends that invariably attend
conflicts over valuable resources.
B. Property’s Spectrum of Intimacy
Scholars recognize that property law sometimes looks beyond title or
curbs titleholder discretion, but they disagree about the frequency and
meaning of these limits. Two schools of property theorists, the “essentialists”
and the progressives, analyze these doctrines in terms of the right to exclude
or social relations, respectively. Building upon these theories, I argue that
intimacy also plays an important role in property law, for an owner’s rights
in a given resource may depend in part upon his degree of closeness with the
person making claims against him. In particular, property law instantiates a
spectrum of intimacy under which rights generally “good against the world”
are sometimes limited when owners attempt to exercise them against
individuals with whom they are particularly close. This insight holds great
promise for property and family law alike.
“Essentialist” theorists contend that the core of property is the owner’s
right to exclude.231 For essentialists, property functions mainly by delegating

230. See id. at 692 (describing zoning as “virtually universal in the metropolitan areas of the
United States”).
231. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith are the lead proponents of the “essentialist” approach to
property law. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 68–70 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–
83 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?];
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998) (arguing
that “the right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence
of property”); see also J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (“[T]he right to
property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the
use of things.”) (emphasis omitted); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1193 (1999) (“While the modern bundle-of-legal relations metaphor reflects well
the possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it gives a weak sense of the ‘thingness’ of
private property.”); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 371, 439 (2003) (describing “the right to exclude as the essential hallmark of the concept
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power to gatekeeper owners, who are free to include or exclude others as they
wish to further their interests in using their resources.232 Although these
theorists admit that property law at times employs “governance” strategies to
manage resource disputes,233 generally speaking they conceptualize an
owner’s rights as good against the world.234
While essentialist theorists view limits on owners’ authority as
exceptional, progressive theorists take these limits to demonstrate the core
attribute of property law.235 Also described as “realists-progressives,”236
progressive theorists understand property’s defining characteristic to be its
role in structuring social relationships.237 Progressive theorists argue that
property law shapes and furthers a society’s broader institutions and
values.238 For progressive theorists—who include scholars advocating
of ‘property’”). For a discussion of the essentialists, see generally Katrina M. Wyman, The New
Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2017).
232. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1709–10
(2012).
233. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002) (arguing that property “rights fall on a
spectrum between the poles of exclusion and governance,” depending upon how decisions about
resource use are made); id. at S455 (describing “a wide range of rules, from contractual provisions,
to norms of proper use, to nuisance law and public environmental regulation . . . as reflecting the
governance strategy”); see also Wyman, supra note 231, at 201–03 (discussing essentialist scholars’
accounts of when owners’ authority may be limited).
234. Smith, supra note 232, at 1691 (describing property as “availing against persons
generally”); id. at 1709 (defining “the in rem aspect of property” as a “basic feature[]”); see also
Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, supra note 231, at 359
(arguing that “the in rem character of property and its consequences are vital to an understanding of
property as a legal and economic institution”).
235. See Dana & Shoked, supra note 191, at 766; id. at 766–67 (“The essentialist-pluralist
debate . . . revolves around the determination of which doctrines form the heart of property law.”);
Wyman, supra note 231, at 193 n.30 (“[I]nterpret[ing] the emphasis on the right to exclude as a
means of emphasizing that owners have authority.”).
236. Dana & Shoked, supra note 191, at 767 n.64; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY
ch. 1, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1936) (“The word ‘property’ . . . denote[s] legal relations between
persons with respect to a thing.”); id. §§ 1–4 (defining, respectively, “right,” “privilege,” “power,”
and “immunity”); Heller, supra note 239, at 1191 (describing Wesley Hohfeld’s “now standard idea
that property comprises a complex aggregate of social and legal relationships made up of rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities”).
237. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 6 (2000)
(“[P]roperty rights describe relations among people and not just relations between people and
things.”); see also Dana & Shoked, supra note 191, at 766 (“For these scholars and their followers,
property . . . is about the social relationships—the overall structure of society—that property
establishes.”).
238. See, e.g., Alexander, Peñalver, Singer & Underkuffler, supra note 157, at 743 (“Property
implicates plural and incommensurable values.”); see also DAGAN, supra note 21, at xi–xii (2011)
(arguing that “property can, and should, serve a pluralistic set of liberal values,”
“includ[ing] . . . utility and autonomy . . . , as well as labor, personhood, community, and
distributive justice”); Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
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approaches to property based, inter alia, in human capabilities,239 human
flourishing,240 and democratic values and processes241—owners have
responsibilities toward, not just rights against, others. Because property
“allocates scarce resources that are necessary for human life, development,
and dignity,” progressive theorists argue that “property laws” should
recognize “the equal value of each human being” by “promot[ing] the ability
of each person to obtain the material resources necessary for full social and
political participation.”242 For these theorists, limits on owners’ authority
arise from, and should be imposed in light of, property law’s role in
positioning individuals within an interpersonal system of reciprocal rights
and obligations.
The differing foci of essentialist and progressive theories reflect the
wide variety of property institutions and the challenge of imposing
conceptual order on such a diverse area of law. To these rich theoretical
resources, I add another complementary account, one based on what I call
intimacy. As I will show, property law sometimes limits owners’ authority
in response to the very real effects of close social relationships. This
approach, which I describe as instantiating a “spectrum of intimacy,” offers
some protection to parties who are especially vulnerable, by reason of their

Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654 (2006) (“From a pluralist perspective, property
regimes, like other legal and social institutions, reflect a number of different values.”).
239. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 70–86 (2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 1–7 (1999);
Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 31, at 134–38.
240. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
THEORY 80–101 (2012); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1851 (1987) (arguing that “the characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when
it is put forward as the sole discourse of human life” and that “we should evaluate inalienabilities
in connection with our best current understanding of the concept of human flourishing”).
241. For the intersection between property and democratic values, see SINGER, supra note 237;
Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1304 (2014)
(“Property law establishes a baseline for social relations compatible with democracy, both as a
political system and [as] a form of social life. . . . Basic democratic values limit the kinds of property
rights that the law will recognize, and they define particular bundles of rights that cannot be
created.”) (emphasis omitted); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1045–47, 1059 (2009). For property and
democratic participation, see generally Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49 CONN. L. REV.
933 (2017); Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus
Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 367 (2014);
Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 467 (2011).
242. Alexander, Peñalver, Singer & Underkuffler, supra note 157, at 744; see also id. (“Property
confers power.”); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1033, 1046 (1996) (“Property rights are, by nature, social rights; they embody how we, as a
society, have chosen to reward the claims of some people to finite and critical goods, and to deny
the claims to the same goods by others.”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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connections to an owner or the owner’s resources, to the wielding of
Blackstonian “despotic dominion” over property.243
Although intimacy analysis clearly falls under the umbrella of
progressive property theory, the approach also sits comfortably with
essentialist approaches to property. Consistent with progressive theories, my
account proposes intimacy to be an additional value in furtherance of which
property law might tailor an owner’s prerogatives to reflect the reality of
social relations. Consistent with essentialist theories, my account recognizes
the general importance of an owner’s authority over resources,244 but
suggests one potential self-limiting principle for a subset of circumstances in
which the right to exclude may be predictably abridged.245 Highlighting a
possible point of intersection between essentialist and progressive
approaches, intimacy analysis offers a complementary theoretical resource
for analyzing property conflicts between non-strangers.
***
The claim that property law recognizes intimacy presupposes a
property-specific account of intimacy. The intimacy of property is broader
than common perceptions of intimacy, which focus on warm relationships
between friends, family members, and sexual partners,246 or the kinds of
intimacy recognized by family law, which focuses on formal markers of
relationship status.247 The intimacy of property need be neither cooperative
nor sexual (though of course it could be either or both),248 and it inheres in a
wide range of relationships, both with and without formal legal recognition.
The intimacy to which property reacts is more closely suggested by tertiary
dictionary definitions that describe intimacy as involving “very close
association, contact, or familiarity.”249 The intimacy of property is not
necessarily a chosen and cultivated emotional closeness, but rather arises
from the parties’ interactions with one another around—and is mediated by
their connections to—valuable resources. And despite often resulting from
circumstances beyond individual control, the intimate relationships of

243. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
244. See supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text.
245. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Intimate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intimate (last visited May 24, 2021) (defining “intimate” as (1)(a) “marked
by a warm friendship developing through long association;” (1)(b) “suggesting informal warmth or
privacy;” and (1)(c) “engaged in, involving, or marked by sex or sexual relations”).
247. Cf. Joslin, supra note 7, at 915.
248. And just as intimacy may exist without sex, sex may occur without intimacy. See generally
Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010).
249. See Intimate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, supra note 246.
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property remain “of a very personal or private nature,”250 for they implicate
some of our deepest human needs.
For a more concrete illustration, consider the nature of relationships
between neighbors, between co-owners, and between decedents and their
heirs.251 These relationships are defined by property. Neighbors are
constituted through their legal connections to adjacent parcels of land; coowners are created when individuals take joint title to property; and heirs are
proclaimed by operation of intestacy law. But these legal relationships also
exist alongside social relationships, both thicker and thinner, the facts and
norms of which may change the way that parties embedded in these relations
act and experience each other’s actions.
Unlike interactions between strangers, which may comprise one-off
transactions, the kinds of relationships in which property attends to intimacy
are ongoing and costly to exit. Neighbors and co-owners can sever their
relations by alienating their property interests, but these courses of action can
be extremely expensive, disruptive to one’s life plans, and detrimental to
one’s personhood.252 The kinds of individuals that intestacy statutes turn into
a decedent’s heirs—spouses, children, parents, siblings, aunts, and uncles—
are even more closely connected.253 Not only does inheritance law employ a
set of previously defined family relationships to distribute resources, thereby
further cementing through property entitlements the importance of sociolegal ties that are already vital to many individuals’ wellbeing. Intestacy also
layers new co-ownership relationships over family relationships when
descendants, ancestors, or collaterals inherit property as a class. Thus,
whether by virtue of ongoing proximity, legal and blood connections, or all
three, neighbors, co-owners, and decedents and their heirs share relationships
of especial closeness—and this closeness, in turn, creates predictable forms
of vulnerability in interactions around resources. This vulnerability to others,
engendered through and around resources, is the form of intimacy to which
property reacts.
Because property law focuses on resource-related vulnerability, its
conception of intimacy encompasses more than just warm, other-regarding
relationships between family members, romantic partners, and friends. It
also includes antagonistic relationships between parties who detest, but
250. Id. (noting its second definition).
251. For a doctrinal discussion of these examples, see infra notes 257–279 and accompanying
text.
252. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982)
(“[C]larify[ing] a . . . strand of liberal property theory that focuses on personal embodiment or selfconstitution in terms of ‘things.’”).
253. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-101, 2-102, 2-103 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L., amended 2019).
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cannot avoid, one another. By way of example, consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s
play, No Exit, in which three characters are locked in a small room
together.254 In the dawning certainty that they will be confined this way for
all of eternity, they confess to each other their darkest secrets—and that
knowledge, combined with their inability to escape, renders them uniquely
capable of making each other miserable. “Hell is . . . other people” only if
one is forced to share space, perhaps our most fundamental resource, with
those whom one loathes.255 Similarly, because neighbors, co-owners, and
family members cannot easily escape one another, one’s uncooperative
behavior can impose especially serious costs on the other. Neighbors might
hate each other with a passion, but their enforced proximity, and resulting
dependence upon one another’s good behavior, makes them intimates in the
eyes of property law.
Defined in this way, intimacy takes many forms—precisely why I
describe property’s approach to intimacy as a “spectrum.” But in all cases in
which property law reacts to intimacy, it is acknowledging the facts of social
life. Because we actively choose and simultaneously have no choice but to
live together, owners do not exercise their prerogatives in a vacuum, and
property rights’ sharp edges are most likely to cut those who are closest.
Thus, property law limits owners’ authority in recognition of the intimacy
that arises from being closely enmeshed with others in a shared social and
physical world.256
To see how property law reacts to intimacy, consider how a right that is
good against a stranger does not always hold with the same force against a
neighbor, a co-owner, or an heir. Many scholars have observed that
American land law does not always permit owners to exclude neighbors from
their property.257 Instead, various black-letter doctrines, including those
establishing easements, adjusting record boundaries, and enjoining spite
fences, limit landowners’ authority vis-à-vis adjacent landowners. One of
these scholars, Stewart Sterk, argues that these doctrines arise from and
enforce “norms of neighborliness.”258 Reflecting the fact that we live in “a
society whose members do not treat relations with neighbors in the same way
they treat relations with strangers,”259 land law too “treat[s] neighbors and
254. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS (Vintage International ed. 1989);
see id. at 10.
255. Id. at 45.
256. For an argument that the fact of vulnerability can require a broad state response, see, e.g.,
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251,
255–56 (2010).
257. See supra note 211.
258. Sterk, supra note 211, at 96.
259. Id. at 90.
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strangers differently”260 by “promot[ing] and indeed requir[ing] limited
cooperation between neighboring landowners.”261 Per Sterk, property law
“subordinate[s] individualist norms . . . between neighbors” because our
“conception” of that relationship “includes continuing mutual dependence[,]
rather than a pattern of discrete and unrelated transactions.”262 Sterk
explicitly locates neighbors’ cooperative obligations on a spectrum, with
parties who are closer by virtue of their repeated interactions or mutual
impact owing one another more than those who merely occupy adjacent
land.263 In a similar vein, Rashmi Dyal-Chand describes land law as effecting
“sharing”—which she defines as “outcomes that represent compromises of
some sort between the parties’ varying interests”—rather than reflexively
confirming title owners’ rights to exclude.264 Dyal-Chand praises these
sharing outcomes as better resolutions of the “many . . . situations” in which
“parties other than the formal owner have legitimate interests” in a piece of
property,265 situations that often arise from “the commonplace behavior of
property owners and non-owners vis-à-vis each other.”266 James Smith also
describes “rules that forge special rights and obligations of neighbors” as
reflecting “the ‘friend model’” of neighborly relations.267 Under these
scholarly readings, American land law recognizes the closeness of
relationships between neighbors by sometimes deviating from the exclusion
model in disputes between them.

260. Id. at 96.
261. Id. at 95; see also id. at 59–63.
262. Id. at 93, 95.
263. Id. at 95–96 (describing “the scope of the landowner’s . . . duty to cooperate” as
“var[ying] . . . with the nature of the relationship between the neighboring landowners”); see also
id. at 100 (noting that “some obligations exist merely by virtue of proximity, others depend on the
passage of time[,]” and the greatest “obligation to cooperate exists between neighbors who have
established a course of dealing”); id. (describing the “neighborly obligations a landowner assumes
merely by purchasing land,” including respecting “unrecorded easement rights” and refraining from
creating nuisances); id. at 99 (stating that “even anonymous neighbors owe each other some
obligation, albeit more limited, when problems arise”); id. at 98 (“Once a landowner has dealt with
his neighbor, he is obliged to resolve any ambiguities in their dealings that might put the neighbor
in a serious predicament.”).
264. Dyal-Chand, supra note 211, at 679; see also id. at 698 (describing sharing outcomes as
blunting “the hard edges of ownership rights”); id. at 684 (describing “remedies in cases recognizing
implied easements,” which “allocat[e] rights to use,” as the property-law doctrine “most reflective
of the sharing impulse”).
265. Id. at 706.
266. Id. at 698.
267. James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 757, 762 (2011); id. at 767–71 (describing variation in adverse possession’s
requirements of adversity, permission, intent, and openness); id. at 775–76 (arguing that the spite
fence doctrine reflects neighbors’ special relation).
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Property law also limits the prerogatives of joint owners against one
another. First, property law does not permit one co-owner to exclude another
from their shared property. Because each co-owner enjoys “an equal right
to” use and “possess the whole” of the joint property,268 a co-owner who
physically excludes another or whose use of the property completely
precludes the other’s use has “ousted” his co-owner and is liable for rent
payments reflecting the value of his possession.269 And because co-owners
may not exclude one another from the benefits of ownership, the law also
acts to spread its burdens, allowing a co-owner who incurs expenses to
maintain joint property to seek contribution or an accounting from her coowners.270 Co-owners are also subject to the law of waste, which requires
each to refrain from using the common property “in a manner that
unreasonably interferes with the [others’] expectations.”271 Finally, the
common law’s stated preference for partition in kind allows dissolution of
the joint ownership relationship without necessarily severing each coowner’s connection to (at least a portion of) the previously shared property.272
Although these limits could be described as necessary corollaries to
sharing title, they can also be understood as reflecting and protecting coowners’ close relationships. While all co-owners are related to one another
through their legal connections to a common piece of property, many coowners are also bound through social relationships that predate holding joint
title.273 In recognition of this fact, property law recognizes a number of joint
property relationships: the tenancy in common, the joint tenancy, and, in
some states, the tenancy by the entirety. Under the default form of coownership, the tenancy in common, each co-tenant’s “separate but undivided
interests in the property” can be conveyed by deed or will or descend through
intestacy.274 Even this least restrictive form of co-ownership occurs
frequently between closely related individuals, a fact that the phenomenon of
heirs property, in which intestate succession creates co-tenancies between

268. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 598.
269. Id. at 612; see also Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of
Cotenant Possession Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331,
340 (1994).
270. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 613.
271. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 280 (9th ed. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
272. See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 (Conn. 1980) (stating “policy . . . favor[ing]
a partition in kind over a partition by sale”).
273. See infra notes 274–276 and accompanying text; see also supra note 253 and accompanying
text.
274. DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER, SCHILL & STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 271, at 388.
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family members, amply demonstrates.275 Because the joint tenancy also
includes a right of survivorship, it has been described as “only appropriate
for” co-owners in “an intimate relationship such as a committed relationship
or family business.”276 And the tenancy by the entirety, which combines a
right of survivorship with protection against a co-tenant’s unilateral
conveyances and debts, is available only to married couples.277 By offering
several forms of joint ownership appropriate to differing degrees of closeness
between co-owners, the law of concurrent interests itself represents a
spectrum of intimacy.
Probate law also limits decedents’ ability to exclude certain family
members from their resources. Although the predominant goal of inheritance
law is to effectuate a testator’s intent, this freedom of disposition is limited
by the surviving spouse’s elective share, as well as set-asides of personal and
homestead property and family allowances for surviving spouses and
dependent children.278 And if a person dies without a will, the state’s
intestacy statute will distribute his or her estate to family members, without
any inquiry into the decedent’s subjective intent.279 These quite expansive
limits on titleholder authority reflect the extremely close nature of family
relationships.
Property law limits an owner’s authority in the ways described above
because relationships between neighbors, co-owners, and family members
are qualitatively different from interactions between strangers. As Sterk
argues in the context of neighbors, under “circumstances” in which “parties
expect to maintain continuing relationships,” “a social and legal model that
depicts” individuals “simply as economic actors seeking . . . to maximize
personal material advantage and personal autonomy” proves
“inadequa[te].”280 Relationships between co-owners and family members are
275. See, e.g., Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial
Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. Q. 737 (2000); T.W. Mitchell,
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Ownership, Political Independence,
and Community through Partition Sales of Tenancy in Common Property, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505
(2001); Faith Rivers, Inequity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs’ Property
Owners Facing Partition in Equity, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2007); see also UNIF.
PARTITION OF HEIRS PROP. ACT 3–4 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2010).
276. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 174, at 599.
277. See, e.g., Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294–95 (Haw. 1977); see also MERRILL &
SMITH, supra note 174, at 599 (describing tenancy by the entirety, which requires co-owners to be
joined by the intimate relationship of marriage).
278. JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 476–77 (8th ed. 2009); Richard F. Storrow, Family Protection in the Law of Succession:
The Policy Puzzle, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 98, 116–22 (2019).
279. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 2019).
280. Sterk, supra note 211, at 92, 95; see also id. at 58–59 (“The cross-boundary allocations in
American land law are generally efficient only if one assumes a societal norm that . . . constrains
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characterized by even higher degrees of dependence and interdependence and
similarly elude description by rational-actor models. It matters little whether
these relations of intimacy arise from or predate interactions around
resources, for the interactions themselves can create new human
vulnerabilities, not just deepen existing ones. For this reason, property’s
spectrum of intimacy reflects and facilitates the wide variety of close human
relationships that play out against the backdrop of, and depend upon access
to, resources.281
Of course, property’s approach is not perfect. Property reacts to
intimacy, but its reaction is currently more of an “impulse” than a fully
realized principle.282 But even in its nascent form, the spectrum of intimacy
offers an important tool for recognizing and supporting a range of close
human relationships—relationships that cannot exist apart from property, and
that are inevitably shaped by the property rules we choose.
***
Not only does property law construct social relationships,283 but it also
reflects a particular vision of how those relationships should be conducted.
Thus intimacy plays an important role in property law, as it does in collective
life. Owners’ authority over their resources may depend upon how close they
are with the persons against whom they exercise it. Rights described as
“good against the world” may not always be good against one’s neighbors,
co-owners, or family members, reflecting the fact that the world expects us
to treat these individuals differently than we do strangers. For relationships
marked by high degrees of interconnection, the law of property employs a
more cooperative, protective model. Property’s tailoring of an owner’s rights
and responsibilities to his relationship with a particular property claimant
reflects a functional approach to resource conflicts, one that better serves the
institution’s varied normative goals.
Understanding how intimacy shapes property law is of great moment
for scholars of property and family law alike. The account of intimacy
developed here not only illuminates a potential point of tangency between

pursuit of self-interest and personal autonomy by expecting limited cooperation and
interdependence between neighboring landowners.”).
281. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 2015, 2015 (2013) (describing property as “necessary for human life” and “an essential part
of human achievement, security, and lifetime satisfaction”); Dana & Shoked, supra note 191, at 787
(“[A]lmost all social interactions occur against the background of some asset.”); see also Gregory
S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745,
798 (2009) (arguing that “interdependency” should “give[] rise” to “obligations”); Fineman, supra
note 256, at 255–56 (arguing that the fact of vulnerability should require a state response).
282. Dyal-Chand, supra note 211, at 653.
283. See SINGER, supra note 237, at 70.
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essentialist and progressive property theories, but also provides a helpful
framework for analyzing resource disputes between non-strangers.284 For
family law scholars, property law’s spectrum of intimacy provides a model
not only for internally reorganizing family law, but also for resituating it visà-vis property law.
III. RE-CENTERING INTIMACY IN FAMILY PROPERTY LAW
Property law’s approach to intimacy has important normative and
doctrinal implications for family law. Normatively, it denaturalizes family
law’s title-driven orientation to ownership, opening up the conceptual space
to criticize that approach as a bad fit for intimate property disputes and to
explore more suitable alternatives. Property law’s recognition of a variety of
forms of intimacy also calls into question the stark distinction that family law
currently draws between marital and nonmarital relationships.
Two doctrinal arguments follow from this normative analysis. First,
family property law should relax its formalistic adherence to title in both
marital and cohabitant property regimes by strengthening and expanding
forms of joint family ownership. Rather than “redistributing” as an
exceptional matter, the family property system should establish corpuses of
shared property, regardless of title, and define appropriate criteria for
distribution when relationships end. Doing so would give family law more
flexibility to consider how intimacy should shape former partners’ respective
property entitlements in shared resources. Second, family law should extend
property’s spectrum of intimacy to unmarried partners by offering a menu of
family statuses with differing degrees of financial obligations. In this way,
property’s approach can help us to re-situate unmarried partners in the space
between spouses and strangers, as well as to rethink the structure of marital
property holding.
A. Property and Intimacy
Property law begins from the premise that title is relative,285 an
orientation that allows it greater flexibility to further a plurality of important
values. Family law, on the other hand, clings reflexively to title, an approach
that tends to perpetuate property inequality between spouses and property
disproportionality between cohabitants. To better protect intimates—ideally
the field’s raison d’être—family law should follow property’s example by
relaxing the hegemony of title.
284. I elaborate some implications of the intimacy framework in concluding this piece and intend
to explore its applications further in future work.
285. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 164, at 164.
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Taking a more relative approach to title would promote richer
conceptions of both ownership and autonomy in family law. Family law’s
current absolutist conception of property reflects its atomistic approach to
family relations, under which family freedom inheres, in part, in formally
consenting to one’s family obligations.286 This vision understands property’s
primary purpose to be safeguarding individual autonomy. But property law
and theory offer a number of different conceptions of property and its
purposes, including some that emphasize the law’s role in facilitating
cooperative collective life.287 Family law need not, and should not, continue
to employ an overly simplified conception of property that is particularly
inapposite as applied between intimates.288
Concern for individual property rights drives family property law,289 but
that orientation is ill-suited to promoting the other important values which
families further.290 In addition to their economic functions, families, both
marital and nonmarital, provide their members with caretaking, emotional
support, and a sense of belonging and identity.291 Indeed, our society both
encourages and relies upon the dependence and interdependence—the
intimacy—inherent in family life.292 Strong deference to title might make
sense in market-based property relations, where easily determined property
rights decrease the costs of economic activity,293 but it makes less sense
between family members, whose interactions around resources are more

286. Stolzenberg, supra note at 28, at 1997–98.
287. See, e.g., Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 31, at 128 (“Property stands . . . squarely at the
intersection between the individual and community . . . . [W]henever we discuss property, we are
unavoidably discussing the architecture of community and of the individual’s place within it.”).
288. Cf. Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage, in 24
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: A JOURNAL OF POLICY 161, 162 (Dana L. Gold ed., 2009)
(“Both supporters and opponents of a ‘contractual’ approach to marriage law tend to use ‘contract’
to signify a market-libertarian normative view about the role of bargaining rather than to refer to the
actual, more complex nature of contract law.”).
289. See supra Part I.
290. Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 28, at 2038 (arguing that “the outsized emphasis currently
placed on families’ economic functions . . . undermines their ability to fulfill other roles more
important to intimate and collective life”). Indeed, family law’s commitment to separate property
principles limits its ability to incorporate other considerations in determining family members’
respective property rights. See supra Part I.
291. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 228
(1997) (describing a “new morality” of family law that is “focused on connection, care, and
commitment to other family members”).
292. Cf. Williams, supra note 150, at 2229 (describing how our socio-economic structures are
built around “an ideal worker with no significant daytime child care responsibilities, supported by
a flow of domestic services from a spouse”).
293. Cf. Smith, supra note 232, at 1693–94 (offering an information costs-based account of
property law).
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frequently directed at promoting other worthy objectives and social
purposes.294
Property law’s spectrum of intimacy offers a better vision of property
for family law. Accepting the invitation to de-emphasize title in disputes
between close social relations, reflecting the parties’ degree of closeness,
would refocus family property law away from individualism and toward
norms of mutuality and sharing. This reorientation would not only yield
normatively desirable distributive results, but also help to support intimate
social relationships.
As property law reminds us, communities arise around and are
comprised through property. Intimacy cannot be separated from property
holding and use, for social closeness affects individuals’ interactions around
resources in qualitatively significant ways. Neighbors’ close relationships
are forged through owning and occupying adjacent or proximate land, while
co-tenants are brought together at least in part through the fact of their
common ownership.295 Even the family relationships that we think of as
predating property are created and reinforced through the sharing of
resources.296 The communities that grow up around property are marked by
dependence and interdependence, and they should be governed by legal rules
that encourage cooperative behavior both practically and expressively.297 In
the face of resource-related vulnerability, property institutions must adopt
appropriately tailored sharing defaults to help both individuals and groups
survive and thrive.
As the intimate property institution par excellence, the family property
system needs to adopt a less individualistic approach to ownership.
Recognizing intimacy and protecting interdependence in families requires
294. Cf. Dana & Shoked, supra note 191, at 759–60 (describing the “questions[] . . . what
values . . . title . . . is supposed to protect—and, in accordance, what legal powers should be
available to the title holder” as “much more important” than “the question of who holds formal
title”).
295. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 838 (2009) (stating
that “ownership of property in a particular community creates and reinforces social ties among
neighbors”).
296. See Peter K. Jonason, Jeanne F. Cetrulo, Janice M. Madrid & Catherine Morrison, GiftGiving as a Courtship or Mate-Retention Tactic?: Insights from Non-Human Models, 7
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCH. 89, 90 (2009) (describing studies of human gift-giving behavior, including
to initiate and deepen romantic relationships); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household:
Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 249, 281 n.206 (2006) (“Loveinfused households are sites of staggering amounts of . . . gift-giving, especially between spouses,
from parents to minor children, and from adult children to elderly parents. . . . Many long-term
cohabiting couples also end up making gifts that pool their financial assets.”).
297. Ellickson, supra note 296, at 304–08 (describing intimates’ cooperative behavior); Smith,
supra note 232, at 1726 (stating that “very important equitable safety valves . . . allow the baselines
of property to be simple without being vulnerable to opportunists”).
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some degree of sharing, even in derogation of title—although, as the idea of
intimacy as a spectrum makes clear, how much sharing is necessary depends
on the nature of the relationship in question.
I begin from the normative premises that the marital relationship should
be understood as an egalitarian community and that spousal property rules
should reflect egalitarian norms.298 But because common-law marital
property regimes revolve around title and emphasize contribution, they
elevate individualistic over egalitarian and communitarian concerns. The
current system’s circumscribed approach toward marital sharing reflects the
enduring legacy of coverture, and partnership theory-based domestic
relations law cannot fully eradicate its traces. For against the backdrop of
gendered market and family structures, formal equality of opportunity only
rarely results in substantive equality of resources and bargaining power. To
truly recognize the equal dignity of spouses, marital property regimes must
fully commit to joint spousal ownership. Doing so would help to equalize
spouses’ positions during marriage and narrow the potential gap between
their economic futures upon divorce.299
I do not take a strong position on what property norms should govern
unmarried partnerships because these relationships are both underinstitutionalized and vary greatly in their degree of commitment and
sharing.300 Indeed, the lens through which scholars view these relationships
influences what kind of property arrangements they think most suitable.
Scholars who favor the status quo reason from autonomy, arguing that
cohabitants should be free to arrange their own financial affairs and that
general private law principles are sufficient to fairly disentangle former
partners.301 Other scholars, concerned for economically vulnerable partners,
298. Cf. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75,
77 (2004) (describing “marriage as an egalitarian liberal community”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two
Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1230 (noting the “commonly
acknowledged . . . conception of marriage as a partnership of two equals”).
299. I outline the doctrinal implications of such a commitment in Part III.B.
300. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 848, 848 (2004) (describing cohabitation as “an incomplete institution”); Kaiponanea T.
Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1025–39 (2018) (describing
axes along which nonmarital couples vary); Brian J. Willoughby, Jason S. Carroll & Dean M.
Busby, The Different Effects of “Living Together”: Determining and Comparing Types of
Cohabiting Couples, 29 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 397, 400–01 (2011) (describing five
different types of cohabiting couples).
301. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 40, at 102 (arguing that courts should “treat [cohabitants] as
two independent units who have not assumed responsibility for each other after a break-up”);
Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 884–97 (2005) (arguing against conscripting cohabiting couples
into marital property regimes) [hereinafter Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?]; Howard O. Hunter,
An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV.
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support imposing relationship-based obligations of various stripes.302 As I
describe below, attending to intimacy can help family law to balance between
furthering autonomy when partners remained relatively resourceindependent and offering protection when cooperative behavior results in
interdependence.
In addition to improving distributive results at relationship dissolution,
the intimacy approach can also help to ameliorate unjustified legal and social
inequality between marital and nonmarital families. The current family
property system helps to entrench a hierarchy of favored and disfavored
family relationships, a hierarchy that scholars refer to as “marital primacy.”
Because family property protections are available only within marriage,
cohabitants must transact at arm’s length if they wish to protect their
economic interests. By totally exempting cohabitants from expectations of
sharing and consigning them to a legal regime constructed for more distant
relationships, family law treats cohabitants as strangers.303 But unmarried
partners are intimates,304 and cohabitant relationships can and do perform
some of the same important social functions that marriage does.305 If
property’s spectrum of intimacy teaches us anything, it is that we denigrate
cohabitant relationships as a form of intimacy by subjecting them to a default
regime of separate property.
Indeed, condemnation of nonmarital
relationships often travels hand-in-hand with denial of family-based property
protections.306 But traditional morality is slim justification for limiting any
1039, 1095 (1978) (arguing that the contract approach best captures cohabitants’ intent); David
Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s
Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001) (criticizing statusbased treatment of cohabitant relationships as “reflect[ing] a profound distrust for individuals’
efforts to set the terms for intimate relationships to meet their own needs”).
302. BOWMAN, supra note 47, at 223–39 (proposing that couples should be treated as married
after two years of cohabitation or birth of a common child, unless they contract out of marriage-like
obligations); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1166–67 (1981) (arguing that cohabitation longer than two years or resulting
in a child’s birth should be treated as lawful marriage unless the couple has agreed otherwise);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 259 (2004) (proposing that the law integrate cohabitants into the divorce
property regime when relationships last longer than five years); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage
Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, If Ever, Should Unmarried
Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 246 (2016); see also Garrison, Is Consent
Necessary?, supra note 301, at 885 (proposing that “a revivified common law marriage doctrine”
govern those “couples who express marital commitments privately”).
303. Indeed, former unmarried partners tend to be situated worse than strangers under general
private law. See Joslin, supra note 7, at 920–21.
304. See supra notes 246–249 and accompanying text; cf. Ellickson, supra note 296, at 248–49
(arguing that householders tend to be intimates).
305. See Matsumura, supra note 300, at 1021.
306. States that bar all recovery for cohabitants condemn these relationships explicitly, usually
with the avowed purpose of encouraging marriage. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 861 (Ill.
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family-based property rights to marriage alone.307 Rather than seeking to root
out sharing norms between cohabitants, which is impossible in any case,308
family law should provide appropriately tailored protection for their
cooperative behavior. Defining cohabitant-specific sharing norms would
protect unmarried partners’ autonomy by insulating them (when appropriate)
from the more comprehensive sharing of marriage, while also dignifying
their relationships as a worthy form of intimacy in the eyes of family property
law. Situating the obligations of marital and nonmarital families along a
continuum in this way would allow the law to recognize and support a range
of adult intimate relationships that all further a variety of valuable individual
and social purposes.
B. Constructing a Continuum in Family Property Law
Property law’s spectrum of intimacy can help us both to re-situate
unmarried partners in the space between spouses and strangers, as well as to
rethink the structure of marital property holding.309 On a conceptual level,
family law should emulate property by relaxing its deference to title. Rather
than “redistributing” as an exceptional matter, the family property system
should establish corpuses of shared property, regardless of title, and define
appropriate criteria for distribution when relationships end. On a more
concrete level, family law should extend property’s spectrum of intimacy by
offering a menu of family statuses with differing degrees of financial
obligations. Intimate partners could choose between forms of family
property holding, just as co-owners can elect between different forms of joint
ownership. Marriage would anchor one end of the spectrum as the property
institution involving the most extensive degree of sharing. Cohabitants
would become neither spouses nor strangers, but rather partners in a
2016) (Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s “oddly myopic
and moralistic view of cohabitation”); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (“[D]iscouraging the establishment of a sexual relationship without ceremonial
marriage . . . protect[s] the moral fabric of society . . . .”); Abrams v. Massell, 586 S.E.2d 435, 441
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that “binding precedent . . . continues to define sexual relationships
between unmarried consenting adults as immoral”) (emphasis omitted); see also Stolzenberg, supra
note 28, at 2021 (“To encourage marriage, these states impose what could be considered penalty
default rules.”).
307. But see Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2015) (arguing that, in the illegitimacy cases, the Supreme “Court
found nothing unconstitutional about discouraging illicit sex and promoting traditional marriage”).
308. Cf. Strauss, supra note 46, at 1261–62 (arguing that private law cannot avoid considering
the relationship between parties); see also supra Part II.B (arguing that property law takes intimacy
into account).
309. I focus here on distribution between former partners when relationships break down,
leaving aside for now the questions of inheritance and of cohabitants’ rights and obligations vis-àvis third parties.
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cooperative endeavor that, while different from marriage, is still worthy of
family law’s respect and support. These changes would produce fairer
resource distributions upon family dissolution, help to ameliorate unjustified
legal and social inequality between marital and nonmarital families, and
refocus family property law toward norms of mutuality and sharing.
1. Equal Joint Ownership for Spouses
For spouses, marriage should entail stronger forms of joint ownership,
which would have implications both during marriage and upon divorce. In
particular, this would mean strengthening community ownership and
management of resources in intact marriages, limiting the scope of separate
property, rethinking the principle of divorce distribution, and increasing the
availability of post-divorce spousal support.
DURING MARRIAGE. Allowing one spouse to exclude the other from
individually titled property during an intact marriage does not appropriately
reflect the institution’s normative values or social meaning.310 Common-law
jurisdictions should replace separate-property holding during marriage with
community property regimes, under which each spouse holds a present,
undivided, one-half interest in all property acquired during marriage.311 By
declaring title irrelevant, the law would emphasize that marriage is an
egalitarian and communitarian-minded property institution.
All jurisdictions should also implement more egalitarian rules regarding
control of conjugal property.312 I begin with the caveat that designing such
rules involves difficult policy trade-offs. Depending on the strategy chosen,
the results could make management of conjugal property unduly
cumbersome, invite invasive state scrutiny of ongoing marital relationships,
or both, while also risking unintended consequences (for example, enabling
financial control by an abusive partner). To minimize these very real
downside risks, I offer only two more circumscribed proposals.
One less-invasive way to balance egalitarianism against marital privacy
is to make spouses one another’s fiduciaries during marriage. In a surprising
number of jurisdictions, marriage does not automatically give rise to a
fiduciary relationship between spouses, meaning that their management of
conjugal property may be subject to a lower standard of care than that

310. Cf. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 298, at 124–32.
311. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 34, at 223.
312. Under the reforms I propose, the distinction between marital and community property
would become less relevant. I therefore use the term “conjugal property” to refer to the corpus
subject to distribution upon divorce.
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required of business partners.313 In California, in contrast, the marital
relationship does impose “a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on
each spouse,” such that “neither shall take any unfair advantage of the
other.”314 This duty applies by statute to “the management and control of the
community assets and liabilities.”315 Making spouses fiduciaries as a matter
of course gives married couples the flexibility to manage assets relatively
freely, while also providing some legal recourse when one spouse acts to the
detriment of the other spouse.
Retirement benefits are another promising area in which reforms could
encourage equal management, in part by explicitly establishing joint
ownership. One best practice, which could be enacted through an
amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”),316 would be to require employers to open a new jointly titled
retirement account for an employee and his or her spouse beginning
immediately in the pay period after the marriage.317 Not only would this
reform emphasize that retirement benefits are jointly owned, it would have
the added benefit of clearly segregating premarital and marital retirement
assets, thereby decreasing expensive and complicated litigation in the case of
divorce. In the alternative, revisions to the Internal Revenue Code could
remove the tax penalties that currently burden those spouses who want to
equalize retirement assets of their own accord.318 Taken together, these
reforms would prevent titled spouses who so desire from individually
controlling the lion’s share of family resources, without making everyday
transactions overly burdensome.
ON DIVORCE. Revised divorce distribution schemes should maintain
the marital period’s commitment to joint property ownership. Following the
now-familiar three step process, courts should: (1) identify the conjugal
313. See, e.g., Lasater v. Guttman, 5 A.3d 79, 94, 194 Md. App. 431, 456–57 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2010) (stating that “a husband and wife are not true fiduciaries, as a matter of law, absent an
agreement establishing that relationship,” nor are they “presumed . . . to occupy a confidential
relationship”); see also Nessler v. Nessler, 902 N.E.2d 701, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (noting that “a
marital relationship alone may not establish a fiduciary relationship”).
314. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (2020).
315. Id. § 1100(e); see also id. (“This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the
other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and
valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest and debts for which the
community is or may be liable, and to provide equal access to all information, records, and books
that pertain to the value and character of those assets and debts, upon request.”).
316. In particular, ERISA’s “spendthrift” provision prohibits an employee from assigning or
alienating his interest in a defined contribution plan. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13).
317. See Monopoli, supra note 81, at 64.
318. See id. at 63–65 (describing tax penalties and how to remove them). Of course, the
transaction costs of shifting retirement assets in this way would remain high; qualified domestic
relations orders (“QDROs”) are notoriously hard to draft and expensive to process.
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property subject to distribution, (2) value it, and (3) distribute it, beginning
from a presumption of equality.
Assuming that the spouses do not live in a hotchpot state,319 the
identification step begins by distinguishing between separate and conjugal
property. The conjugal estate should be comprised of all conjugal property—
i.e., property acquired by either spouse’s efforts during marriage—plus a
sliding-scale percentage of the parties’ separate property, based upon the
length of the marriage. Converting a portion of separate assets into conjugal
property subject to distribution would reflect the fact that “propertied spouses
tend to share more and more of their individual assets as marriage
progresses, . . . as their relationship grows and deepens.”320 Many scholars
have offered specific proposals for conversion formulae, including the ALI,
Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, Shari Motro, and Joan Williams. 321
States could either adopt one of these proposals or develop alternative
methods for calculating how much separate property to make subject to
divorce distribution.
Once the conjugal corpus is identified and valued, that property should
be distributed with a strong presumption of equal division. This presumption
reflects the nature of marriage as an egalitarian property institution of deep
sharing.322 Considerations of financial fault—for example, extravagant
spending on an extra-marital affair or dissipation of family funds through
gambling or extremely risky investments—might justify deviation from an
equal division, as might one spouse’s extreme financial need due to a serious
medical condition or disability.323
THE POST-MARITAL PERIOD. Under family law’s current
individualistic approach to property, spousal support is seen as intrusive and
exceptional. Yet the effects of sharing behavior—economic dependence and
319. See supra note 111.
320. Motro, supra note 110, at 1625; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION,
supra note 11, § 4.12(a) cmt. a (“After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of
their separate-property assets as separate . . . . Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that
such assets will be available to provide for their joint retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse,
or for other personal emergencies. The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the spouses
will have made decisions about their employment or the use of their marital assets that are premised
in part on such expectations about the separate property of both spouses.”).
321. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION, supra note 11, § 4.12; Frantz & Dagan, supra
note 298, at 106–19; Motro, supra note 110, at 1650 (proposing a “theory of marriage as a merger
of risk and reward”); id. at 1652–58 (working out implications); Williams, Do Wives Own Half?,
supra note 102, at 265–66.
322. See supra notes 296–299 and accompanying text.
323. Cf. Motro, supra note 110, at 1658 (“[P]resumption in favor of equal division” reflects “the
central premise of the system,” which “is attributing equal freedom and risk to both parties during
marriage.”); see also FINEMAN, supra note 17 (arguing that divorce law should be less focused on
contribution and more attentive to financial need).
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interdependence—often transcend the durational limits of marriage.324 The
reality is that an ideal worker’s wage continues to be the product of both
partners’ work, and mothers continue to transfer earning power to their
husbands.325 Conceiving of ex-spouses’ post-marital incomes as a combined
family wage recognizes the reality that former intimates, having once knit
their lives together, cannot immediately be resituated as legal strangers.326
Under a joint-property approach to marriage, post-divorce transfer
payments would be routinely available, even if for a potentially limited
duration. Continuing a more constrained degree of resource-sharing for a
period after marriage, especially in the case of long unions involving
children, can help to ensure that former spouses do not face grossly unequal
economic futures after divorce. Post-divorce transfer payments are also a
less complicated and normatively preferable way to spread marital costs and
benefits than is valuing human capital for inclusion in the conjugal estate, a
difficult undertaking that can raise commodification concerns.327
2. A Menu of Statuses and Equitable Recovery for Cohabitants
Property’s spectrum of intimacy also suggests a novel approach to the
problem of cohabitant obligations. Under the current regulatory approach,
family law analogizes unmarried partners to either spouses or strangers.
Taking the first route, a small number of jurisdictions ask how closely an
unmarried couple’s relationship approximated an idealized vision of
marriage—a standard that even many married couples may not meet.328 If
324. Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L.
351, 359 (1989) (describing marriage as effecting a “transfer of earning power from wife to
husband”); see also Motro, supra note 110, at 1629 n.13 (describing her vision of marriage as
“merger of risk and reward” as “not inconsistent with a more robust system of alimony”).
325. See Williams, supra note 150, at 2257–66 (arguing that family members’ wages should be
understood as jointly owned and that post-divorce incomes should therefore equalized); Claire Cain
Miller, Women Did Everything Right. Then Work Got ‘Greedy.’ How America’s obsession with long
hours
has
widened
the
gender
gap,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/upshot/women-long-hours-greedy-professions.html;
see
also Goldfarb, supra note 324, at 363 (“While the marital partnership itself does not survive divorce,
the effects of differing earning powers do. If no allowance is made for this fact at divorce, the
husband reaps a windfall at the wife’s expense. Therefore, a central goal of alimony should be to
avoid undue disparity between the former spouses’ standards of living.”).
326. Cf. Milton C. Regan, Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric,
82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2310 (1994).
327. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1062 (1995); Margaret Jane Radin, Market
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1987); Regan, supra note 326, at 2309–10; Nancy
C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1631 (1996).
328. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the Traditional
Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 517 (1998) (“The salient fact about marriage . . . is that one size does not
fit all.”).
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the relationship passes this high threshold, then marriage-like recovery,
which implicates all assets acquired by the efforts of either cohabitant over
the course of the relationship, might be available.329 In most jurisdictions,
courts treat cohabitants as parties at arm’s length, applying general private
law theories of recovery based in contract or equity, which only rarely yield
recovery.330 Neither approach is a good fit for unmarried partners, because
most cohabitant relationships tend to fall somewhere in between the spousal
and strangers paradigms. Recognizing a spectrum of intimacy would allow
family law to develop legal rules and sharing norms more appropriate to the
levels of intimacy that inhere in a range of cohabitant relationships. In
particular, the law of cohabitants should comprise a menu of family statuses
whose default property implications are more limited than marriage,
supplemented by a set of equitable remedies for protecting cooperation upon
the dissolution of informal relationships. In the alternative, if such gap-filling
measures prove impracticable to implement, cohabitants should at least have
recourse to a reformed private law of intimates.
The best way to extend the spectrum of intimacy into family law is to
develop a moderately extensive menu of family forms with differing degrees
of property sharing, just as property law offers multiple forms of joint
ownership.331 What these statuses might look like will vary from state to

329. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (discussing doctrines of committed intimate
relationships, common-law marriage, community property by agreement, and implied joint
venture).
330. See supra notes 50–66 and accompanying text (discussing implied contracts and
restitution).
331. See supra notes 273–277 and accompanying text; cf. HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL
HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017) (arguing that to promote freedom, the state
should supply a menu of form contracts between which individuals may choose); NANCY D.
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW
46–62 (2008); Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 64–66 (2012) (arguing that
legal benefits currently attached to marriage should be disaggregated and redistributed either
directly to individuals or based on other, nonmarital relationships); Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family
Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 366 (2016) (“[F]amily law ought to adopt a
pluralistic version that is bounded by core values of substantive autonomy and equality.”); David
L. Chambers, The “Legalization” of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 813–18 (1985) (arguing that the government should regulate families
according to a principle of “supportive neutrality”); William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism:
The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1886
(2012) (arguing that family law’s “new normative foundation supports regulation through guided
choice rather than . . . mandatory rules”); Joslin, supra note 27, at 432 (arguing that the “family
law . . . system needs to include, but not be limited to, marriage”); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v.
Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1209–10 (2016) (arguing for “a
project of family and relationship pluralism that respects and values a broader array of relationship
and family forms than civil marriage alone”); Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship
Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW
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state, and such jurisdictional variation could help to spur innovation. Some
already existing examples include California’s domestic partnership
registries, Colorado’s designated beneficiaries scheme, and Hawaii’s
reciprocal beneficiaries status.332 With a variety of less property-intensive
legal options available, more unmarried partners may choose to formalize
their relationships. The law could also encourage more couples to take on
some inter se property obligations by offering them easy day-to-day ways to
do so, for example by including such options when individuals sign leases,
elect HR benefits, or purchase insurance policies.333 By providing a
continuum of intimate property regimes of which marriage is just one, family
law would respect and recognize the differing degrees of commitment and
sharing that inhere in a wide range of cohabitant relationships.
In addition to expanding its menu of intimate statuses, family law should
also protect cohabitants who do not opt into status or formally contract, but
whose relationships nonetheless exhibited great degrees of interdependence
around resources.334 For these cohabitants, family law should develop an
equitable, asset-restricted cause of action for recovery of some property
acquired during the relationship but titled in the other partner’s name. By
“equitable,” I mean that the distributive principle should almost never be
marriage’s community-minded egalitarianism, but instead a criterion or
criteria appropriate to the nature of the particular relationship. I use the term
“asset-restricted” to indicate that the corpus of property subject to distribution
should almost always be more circumscribed between unmarried partners
than it is between spouses. By varying both the distributive criteria and the
corpus subject to distribution, family law would follow the approach of
property law, which not only recognizes degrees of intimacy, but also defines
the res of property disputes more narrowly than family law does.

& INEQ. 345, 349 (2010) (arguing for a “functionalist approach to relationship recognition”
combined with “a ‘menu’ of alternatives to marriage”).
332. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (2020);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (2020); John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next
for Relationship Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 382–85 (2015) (describing Colorado’s
designated beneficiaries and Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiaries laws); Douglas NeJaime, Before
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 114–54 (2014) (describing the history of California’s municipal and
statewide domestic partner registries).
333. Cohabitants’ rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis third parties are also an important issue.
See generally Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Beyond Property: The Other Legal Consequences of
Informal Relationships, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1325 (2019). However, those considerations are outside
the scope of this Article.
334. Indeed, most cohabitants do not formalize their relationships. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra
note 300, at 1018 (“Couples . . . rarely elect to enter a formal nonmarital status. . . . Written
agreements between nonmarital partners also appear to be rare.”).
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To illustrate this difference, consider a conflict between neighbors A
and B over whether A enjoys a right-of-way over B’s land. Even if a court
declares that an easement exists, A’s property right will be limited to use of
a particular path or roadway; the easement will not entitle A to enter B’s
house to sit and read in B’s favorite chair.335 When property law grants rights
in derogation of title, those rights are cabined to a specific asset with which
a claimant has had especially close contact, rather than implicating other
assets of the titleholder with which a claimant has had little or no contact.
Contrast property law’s focus on particular resources and uses with
family law’s more wide-ranging conception of the property at issue when a
relationship ends. Divorce distribution appropriately implicates all property
acquired by the efforts of either spouse during the marriage, but cohabitant
cases dispute the same set of assets.336 The breadth of the contested corpus
subjects cohabitants to the same expansive financial discovery required of
divorcing spouses, even if a court ultimately concludes that no or only
minimal shifting of property in derogation of title is warranted. Defining the
“cohabital estate” in this way makes the process of resolving unmarried
partners’ property disputes unnecessarily expensive and invasive in a
significant proportion of cases.
Instead of categorically implicating all property acquired by the efforts
of either partner over the duration of their relationship, as marital property
regimes do, the cohabitant property remedy should take an asset-restricted
approach by identifying and determining rights in a narrower, functionally
defined corpus of property. At a minimum, and as a matter of property law,
the cohabital estate would include any assets and debts titled in joint name.
I propose that the cohabital corpus also include those assets that concretely
furthered an unmarried couple’s life together. “Concretely furthering,” like
tort law’s requirement of proximate cause, is necessarily a value judgment

335. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.10 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(“The purpose of an easement created by use . . . is generally defined specifically so that only the
use that created the easement and closely related ancillary uses are included within the purpose.”)
336. See supra notes 45–47, 110–117 and accompanying text. Similarly, the July 2020 draft of
the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act (“UCERA”), then
called the Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Act, would authorize “a cohabitant” to
“assert a claim for . . . fair and equitable division of assets acquired and liabilities incurred as a result
of the efforts of either cohabitant during cohabitation, without regard to legal title,” although
“court[s] may not presume that any particular . . . division of assets or liabilities is equitable.”
ECON. RTS. OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS ACT § 12(a), (e) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, Tentative Draft,
July 24, 2020), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.
ashx?DocumentFileKey=75dee7ba-cbb7-dcab-4d19-ffb3ea8460df&forceDialog=0. The UCERA
is limited to permitting “equitable claim[s]” between cohabitants “based on contributions to the
relationship.” UNIF. COHABITANTS ECON. REMEDIES ACT § 7(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, Tentative
Draft, June 1, 2021) [hereinafter UCERA June 2021 Draft] (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
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that will depend on the nature and length of the parties’ relationship.337 This
value judgment should not, however, be made in accordance with family
law’s traditional conception of intimacy, but rather by employing the
expanded conception of intimacy provided by property law and described
above.338 In general, courts should ask which assets constituted the intimate
community, what kind of a community it was, and what relationship- and
resource-specific vulnerabilities it engendered.339
To render this query more concrete and methodical, it is helpful to
consider property’s strategies for assigning entitlements in derogation of
title.340 In particular, family law should allow cohabitants to make claims
against those assets that were actually used, labored, or relied upon in
furtherance of the relationship.
By way of illustration, a pattern of use might support an untitled
partner’s equitable claims against resources such as housing, furniture and
household goods, or a car titled in the other’s name, but not against
individually titled intangible resources, such as interests in businesses,
transaction accounts, and retirement and investment accounts, which would
remain outside the cohabital estate. The untitled partner’s use right might be
conceptualized as a kind of an easement, which the titled partner could “buy
out” in the form of a court-defined severance payment. Focusing on resource
use also provides justification for equitably dividing individually titled debts,
for example credit card debts, that were incurred to cover costs of living and
other joint expenses. These debts, which are often the most significant form
of property among low-income cohabitants, should also be included in the
cohabital estate.
Untitled cohabitants should also be permitted to bring property claims
based upon their labor in furtherance of a relationship. Such claims have
traditionally failed, not only because both law and society have long devalued
“women’s work,” but also because of the high administrative and privacy
costs of establishing a couple’s division of household labor.341 To navigate
these minefields, labor-based property claims should be assessed with an eye

337. Cf. Leon Green, Causal Relation in Legal Liability—In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 513, 532 (1927).
338. See supra Part II.B.
339. See supra notes 248–281 and accompanying text (describing how resources constitute
communities and the values such communities might reflect and further).
340. See supra Part II.A.
341. Cf. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 2139, 2145–47 (2019).
The UCERA permits cohabitants to bring “equitable claim[s] based on contributions to the
relationship,” UCERA June 2021 Draft, supra note 336, § 7(b), which are defined to specifically
include “cooking, cleaning, shopping, household maintenance, conducting errands, or other
domestic services . . . and . . . otherwise caring for the other cohabitant, a child in common, or
another family member of the other cohabitant,” id. § 2(3)(A).
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to both which assets the labor affected, as well as the benefits conferred and
detriments incurred by the laborer. Labor that contributes to the value of a
concrete asset would bring that asset into the cohabital estate, in the style of
restitution,342 while labor combined with reliance, i.e., cutting back on work
hours or quitting a job to raise joint children or to enable one’s partner to
succeed in a “greedy” profession, would justify conceiving of the supported
partner’s earned income and increased human capital as shared assets. 343
Although earned income would be included in the cohabital estate and
subjected to equitable distribution, the increased human capital should not.
Given the especially personal nature of human capital, the laborer’s interest
in this resource should be “cashed out” through rehabilitative or transitional
post-relationship transfer payments.
A relationship’s reliance upon the availability of certain assets may also
justify their inclusion in the cohabital estate, though the extent to which
reliance renders assets subject to distribution will depend on the nature and
duration of the relationship. Because many cohabitants view their
relationships as contingent and are reluctant to pool assets,344 the law should
not automatically assume a high level of reliance between unmarried
partners. Thus, in shorter-term relationships, use- and labor-based claims are
likely to predominate. However, even relatively brief reliance upon a richer
partner’s assets (for example, if one partner covered the majority of living
costs) might ground limited post-relationship transfer payments to ease the
vulnerable partner’s transition to his or her new life. This proposal would
justify the trial court’s rehabilitative award to Michelle Marvin, which was
vacated on appeal.345 In longer-term high-commitment relationships,
reliance-based claims might become more important and may implicate
intangible assets. Long-term unmarried partners’ structuring of their
common lives against the backdrop of interests in businesses, transaction
accounts, and retirement and investment accounts might justify converting a
portion of these individually titled assets into cohabital property, perhaps on
a schedule conceptually analogous to those proposed in the ALI Principles
and the Uniform Probate Code.346 This kind of reliance would counsel for
342. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28(1) (AM. L.
INST. 2011).
343. See Miller, supra note 325; cf. UCERA June 2021 Draft, supra note 336, § 7 cmt.
(“mak[ing] clear that unjust enrichment and other equitable claims available to cohabitants need not
be tied to a specific asset, and that such claims may be based on non-monetary contributions to the
relationship”).
344. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 40, at 94, 99–101.
345. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1981) (vacating the rehabilitative
award as lacking legal basis); see also supra notes 1 & 4 and accompanying text.
346. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION, supra note 11, § 4.12; UNIF. PROB. CODE §
2-203(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2008) (setting forth a schedule for determining what percentage of a
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different results for Victoria Hewitt and Shaniqua Tompkins, as well as in
the Friedman case.347
This asset-restricted, functional approach to defining the cohabital estate
could contribute to more appropriate outcomes in cohabitant property
disputes. This approach is not only potentially less invasive and less
financially risky for couples who have not explicitly invited the state into
their intimate relationships. By analyzing the parties’ relationships to one
another and to their shared resources in the first step of the equitable
distribution analysis, this approach can also help to take some pressure off
the third, distributive step. For rather than beginning with an expansive
corpus and considering commitment, contribution (which is a species of
desert), reliance, and intent all together, and only in the distribution phase, as
current cohabitant cases do, my proposal asks a few important normative
questions right off the bat. Constructing the cohabital corpus according to
property law’s expansive conception of intimacy gives us confidence that all
the assets subject to distribution are truly community resources. With the
underlying question of entitlement thus settled in the identification phase, the
distribution phase need only ask what kind of sharing outcome to
effectuate.348 Breaking down the inquiry in this way allows us to import some
of the communitarian values that property law can provide, prior to the
necessary step of individuating property entitlements between former
unmarried partners.
Although the cohabital estate is comprised of shared resources,
distribution should not begin with a presumption of equal division. Instead,
courts should consider a variety of factors, some of which are familiar from
current equitable distribution schemes and some of which are not. These
factors might include (1) the partners’ respective contributions to the
relationship, including domestic services and caretaking; (2) the degree to
which the parties shared tangible and intangible property; (3) one party’s
vulnerability resulting from the couple’s interdependence around resources;
(4) the degree of the parties’ commitment to one another and the relationship;
and (5) career or other economic sacrifice for the benefit of the other partner
or the relationship. I do not intend for these factors to be exhaustive, and it
would be up to each state to determine which considerations should apply in
which cases.
Here, jurisdictional variation and the common-law
development of bodies of precedent would help to move cohabitation law
decedent’s augmented estate is the marital-property portion for purposes of a spouse’s elective
share).
347. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); Tompkins v. Jackson, No. 104745/2008,
2009 WL 513858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2009); Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct.
App. 1993); see also supra notes 2, 3, 5, 6, 58 and accompanying text.
348. Cf. Dyal-Chand, supra note 211, at 714–15.
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forward. In terms of what overarching principles should govern distribution
of the cohabital estate, equality may be appropriate in the case of long-term,
high-commitment relationships of extensive sharing, while for shorter-term,
more contingent relationships, principles like desert and encouraging fair
dealing may predominate.
Under this proposal, as cohabitant relationships become more marriagelike, the cohabital corpus would begin to approximate the conjugal estate and
cohabital distribution principles would tend toward equality. Thus, although
I begin with a formal distinction between spouses and unmarried partners,
the latter could access marriage-like recovery when their relationships
functionally approximate those of committed, economically interdependent
spouses. In such a case, the law as applied would blur the line between formal
and functional families—a result that is nearly impossible to achieve under
the current system of defaults. In this way, the proposed approach balances
between the predictability of a bright-line rule (for families who have
formally elected such treatment) and the flexibility of standards (for families
who have not).349
I attach two additional limits to this proposal. First, because this inquiry
is fact-based and extensive, it might make sense to recognize claims only
between those cohabitants whose relationships have lasted a significant
period of time.350 Recent studies suggest that most cohabitations end within
three years,351 meaning that four or five years might be a reasonable
minimum duration for states to choose. Limiting equitable, asset-based
recovery to cohabitant relationships of significant length would help to avoid
entangling in the legal process those intimates who eschew marriage for
precisely this reason.
Second, all of the above proposals would be default rules that parties
could vary by contract or by keeping records showing that they segregated

349. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
350. This approach also finds support in property law, which requires the running of a statutorily
set time period before adverse possession or an easement by prescription may be established. See,
e.g., RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael Allan Wolf Desk ed.,
Matthew Bender 2009) (1890).
351. Jessica Cohen & Wendy Manning, The Relationship Context of Premarital Serial
Cohabitation,
39
SOC.
SCI.
RSCH.,
Sept.
2010,
at
16,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3874393/ (finding cohabitations lasted an average
of 31.68 months); Paula Y. Goodwin, William D. Mosher & Anjani Chandra, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL
PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 3 (2010),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf (estimating that most cohabitations end
either in marriage or dissolution within three years).
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their property during the relationship. Defaults tend to be sticky,352 especially
because cohabitants who failed to elect a family status are unlikely to have
attended to other legal formalities.353 But the defaults of the approach I
propose are fairer than the current regime’s. Not only does the scheme
outlined above put the onus on the richer party to contract around the
default,354 but it is also more narrowly tailored to a particular set of unmarried
partners than full marriage-like obligations would be.
If this set of equitable gap-filling measures proves impracticable,
recourse to general private-law protections should be made more available
for cohabitants. Private law is full of biases against domesticity, the
unsurprising result of coverture’s influence on every aspect of the commonlaw legal system.355 Reducing these impediments to unmarried partners’
recovery would go a long way toward preventing property injustice between
members of functional families.356 Two examples of such bias-removal
include the 2011 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,
which jettisons traditional doctrinal requirements that would normally
prevent cohabitants from recovering against one another,357 as well as the
draft Uniform Cohabitants’ Economic Remedies Act, which aims “to remove
bars to claims which arise within the framework of a cohabiting
relationship.”358 A reformed private law of intimates would adjust its
assumptions in light of the behavior typical of intimate relationships. In
particular, it would expect cooperation but understand it to be mutually
beneficial, furthering both parties’ interests, rather than purely altruistic.
Doing so would not only protect economically vulnerable cohabitants who
engage in sharing behavior, but would also help, over time, to abolish the
remaining vestiges of coverture—the root of property inequality in families.
CONCLUSION
Although the family is conventionally described as a domain of sharing,
family law’s deferential approach to title reveals a deep regard for individual
property rights. In contrast, property law takes a more nuanced approach to
ownership, instantiating a “spectrum of intimacy” that reflects the
352. See generally Erez Aloni, Compulsory Conjugality, 53 CONN. L. REV. 55 (2021)
(presenting results of a qualitative survey of unmarried couples in British Columbia).
353. Joslin, supra note 7, at 923 (suggesting that unmarried couples may not undertake family
formalities because they are busy living their lives).
354. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 259–61 (2004).
355. Cf. Antognini, supra note 341 (describing remnants of coverture).
356. I intend to expand on this argument in future work.
357. See Sherwin, supra note 60, at 717–18, 719–20.
358. UCERA June 2021 Draft, supra note 336, § 3 cmt.
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vulnerability inherent in a wide range of close social relations constructed
through and conducted around resources. As I have argued above, family
law should adopt property’s approach as the basis for an intimate property
system capable of reflecting and honoring the diversity of modern family
relationships.
This Article puts family law more closely into conversation with
property law, a move that presents intriguing possibilities for both fields. I
have already sketched out some normative and doctrinal implications of the
spectrum of intimacy for family law. But the intimacy approach can be used
to evaluate and rethink property law, as well.
The intimacy approach provides an additional lens for assessing and reenvisioning current property doctrine. Although I suggest that family law
take property’s spectrum of intimacy as a model, property law is by no means
perfect, as progressive property scholars have noted.359 Property law reacts
to intimacy, but its recognition of intimacy is currently more of an “impulse”
than a fully realized and actionable principle.360 To advance this nascent
tendency, we might begin by asking whether current property doctrines
improperly penalize cooperative behavior, or effectively incentivize
normatively desirable interdependence, or provide sufficient protection in
cases of inevitable dependence. These inquiries are the first step in teasing
out which sharing norms might be appropriate between disputants related by
different degrees of closeness, as well as what kinds of legal rules should
reinforce those norms. The goal should be to preserve a generous sphere of
individual autonomy, bounded when owners’ exercise of that autonomy runs
afoul of other-facing norms appropriate to the given resource and
relationship. This method could be fruitfully employed, for example, in the
project of developing “the law of neighbors” as a legal category,361 and
indeed I intend to explore intimacy between neighbors in future work. The
intimacy approach to property law can also offer a compelling theoretical
justification for doctrinal change. Here, the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act, which reforms the law of co-tenants to protect family members

359. See, e.g., Alexander, Peñalver, Singer & Underkuffler, supra note 157; Dyal-Chand, supra
note 211, at 653 (“Property outcomes have the potential to address acute problems of fairness and
distributive justice to a much greater extent than they currently do.”).
360. Dyal-Chand, supra note 211, at 653 (describing as “a current and compelling problem in
property law that the impulse to share often remains inchoate”).
361. Smith, supra note 267, at 758 (“The future might well bring a world in which . . . a
specialized body of doctrine with regard to neighborly relations emerges.”); id. at 760 (“[I]f the field
of neighbor law develops in the United States, academics will have to lead the way. . . . [S]uch an
effort could lead to a salutary simplification of the law of neighbors.”).
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from involuntarily losing their property, is a prime example.362 In these ways,
the intimacy approach opens up promising avenues for research and law
reform in both family and property law.

362. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Historic Partition Law Reform: A Game Changer for
Heirs’ Property Owners (Tex. A&M U. Sch. L. Rsch. Paper No. 19–27, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403088.

